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Instituting Collective Bargaining at
California's Universities and
Colleges: The Outlines of
HEERA
By REGINALD ALLEYNE*
In 1978 the California Legislature enacted the Higher Education
Employer-Employee Relations Act' (HEERA), the latest step in the in-
cremental development of the collective bargaining option for Califor-
nia public employees. HEERA, which became effective July 1, 1979,
empowers California's university and college employees to select a col-
lective bargaining representative and engage in collective bargaining-
powers previously granted to all other California state employees.
2
* Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles. B.S., 1954, Tufts Uni-
versity; LL.B., 1959, Howard University; LL.M., 1969, Columbia University. The author
was chairman of the original California Educational Employment Relations Board (now
Public Employment Relations Board) during 1976 and 1977. The author gratefully ac-
knowledges the valuable research assistance of University of California at Los Angeles stu-
dents Leonard Bierman and Roberta Battle, made possible by research funds provided by
the University of California at Los Angeles Institute of Industrial Relations.
1. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3560-3599 (West Supp. 1979).
2. The California Legislature has at different times enacted four public employment
collective bargaining statutes. The three of major importance to this Article are the Educa-
tional Employment Relations Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3540-3549.3 (West Supp. 1979) (ef-
fective Jan. 1, 1976), covering public school and community college employees; the State
Employer-Employee Relations Act, id §§ 3512-3524 (effective July 1, 1978), covering state
employees other than those employed by the university and college systems; and the Higher
Education Employer-Employee Relations Act, id §§ 3560-3599 (effective July 1, 1979), cov-
ering all employees of the University of California, the California State University and Col-
leges, and Hastings College of the Law. The three statutes will be referred to in this Article
as EERA, SEERA, and HEERA, respectively. Inadvertently, the Legislature failed to name
officially what is commonly known as EERA. EERA is also know by its popular name, the
Rodda Act, after its principal sponsor and draftsman, California State Senator Albert S.
Rodda. For a history of events leading to enactment o EERA, see Rodda, Foreword-
Public Employment Relations Symposium Collective Bargaining in the'Calfonma Schools, 18
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 845 (1978).
The fourth public employee collective bargaining statute is the Meyers-Milias-Brown
Act, CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3500-3510 (West 1966 & Supp. 1979). This Act regulates local
public employee organizations, confers certain collective bargaining rights, and allows local
governments and agencies to enact collective bargaining rules and regulations. For a discus-
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This Article, written without benefit of interpretation of HEERA
by its administering agency or the courts, is a preliminary analysis of
HEERA's outlines. The Article examines the extent to which
HEERA's development was influenced by earlier California public sec-
tor collective bargaining legislation,3 which itself was greatly influenced
by the private sector's 1935 National Labor Relations Act 4 (NLRA).
The Article should provide some useful guidance in understanding
how basic labor-management relations law concepts might be applied
to California's vast system of higher education.
5
HEERA regulates relationships between employers in California's
higher education system and organizations representing or seeking to
represent employees of the system. Only upon close examination of
HEERA are material departures from the NLRA discernible. With the
notable exceptions of HEERA's fact finding provision, which is an as-
pect of impasse resolution,6 and its public notice provision,7 which has
no NLRA counterpart, a fair summary of HEERA's purposes and pro-
visions would not differ significantly from a summary of those of the
NLRA. HEERA provisions, as implemented by Public Employment
Relations Board8 (PERB) regulations, authorize higher education em-
ployees to select or reject a collective bargaining representative;9 define
certain employer and union conduct as unfair practices;' 0 establish
general criteria for resolving voting and other representation election
controversies;" l and empower the PERB, HEERA's counterpart to the
National Labor Relations Board 12 (NLRB), to decide unfair practice or
representation disputes that arise under HEERA.' 3 The Article dis-
sion of the Act see Grodin, Public Employee Bargaining in Caifornia: The Meyers-Milias-
Brown Act in the Courts, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 719 (1972).
3. See note 2 & accompanying text supra.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
5. California's system of higher education includes the University of California, the
California State University and Colleges, California Community Colleges, and Hastings
College of the Law. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 66010, 89001, 92000-92144, 92200-92214
(West 1978). Community Colleges are under EERA coverage. See note 2 supra.
6. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3591-3594 (West Supp. 1979). See notes 220-23 & accompa-
nying text infra.
7. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3595 (West Supp. 1979). See notes 199-214 & accompanying
text infra.
8. 8 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 50,000-51,530 (1979).
9. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3565 (West Supp. 1979).
10. Id §§ 3571 (unlawful employer practices), 3571.1 (unlawful employee organization
practices). See notes 148-98 & accompanying text infra.
11. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3573-3578 (West Supp. 1979).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1976).
13. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3563.2. See notes 24-33 & accompanying text infra.
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cusses the main divisions of HEERA as outlined by the Act's topical
headings: administration; representation issues, focusing on unit deter-
mination questions; unfair practices issues; public notice requirements;
and grievance and bargaining impasse resolution procedures.
Administration
HEERA, like other labor-management relations legislation, is
written with an elasticity of language that reflects a wise and practical
spirit of legislative compromise. Faced with conflicting requests for
particulars by management and labor groups, legislatures frequently
draw up labor-management relations legislation that is sufficiently gen-
eral to delay the resolution of controversies over meaning until they are
addressed on a case by case basis by the appropriate administering
agency or the courts.14 Perhaps more so than in other administratively
regulated areas of the law, the meaning of labor-management relations
statutes is derived from decisions of administrative agencies that have
initial jurisdiction to interpret the statute. A labor relations statute
such as HEERA, written with a calculated absence of specificity, thus
scarcely can be comprehended by simply reading its provisions.
HEERA's administering agency, the PERB, accordingly will have a
powerful role to play in determining HEERA's meaning through
adjudicatory decisions and administrative regulations.
The Origins of the PERB
Section 3563 of the California Government Code provides that
HEERA "shall be administered by the Public Employment Relations
Board."' 5 The PERB was created in 1976 by the Educational Employ-
ment Relations Act' 6 (EERA), which authorizes collective bargaining
14. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976), is replete with
examples. Rather than list mandatory subjects of bargaining, § 8(d) of the NLRA, 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976), provides that in appropriate circumstances an employer is obligated
to bargain over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." The Na-
tional Labor Relations Board decides on a case by case basis, subject to judicial review, what
constitutes "terms and conditions of employment" within the meaning of the NLRA. Unit
determination standards under the NLRA are even more vague. See § 9(b) of the NLRA,
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976); see notes 55, 57-60 & accompanying text infra.
15. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3563 (West Supp. 1979).
16. Id § 3541(a). Section 3541(a) created the Educational Employment Relations
Board and fixed the number of Board members, the duration of their terms, and the manner
of their appointments. The Board originally was named the Educational Employment Rela-
tions Board and its jurisdiction was limited to public primary and secondary schools and
community colleges. SEERA § 3513(g), CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3513(g) (West Supp. 1979),
changed the name of the Board to the Public Employment Relations Board. Sections
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for public school and community college employees.' 7 In 1977, the
State Employer-Employee Relations Act1 8 (SEERA) extended the
PERB's jurisdiction to state employees, with the exception of employ-
ees of the state's universities and colleges. In 1978, the PERB's juris-
diction was extended further by HEERA,' 9 to include employees of the
state university and college systems.
The PERB has three members who are appointed by the Gover-
nor, subject to confirmation by the California Senate.20 As provided
originally in EERA, and as retained in both SEERA and HEERA, the
PERB is authorized to appoint a general counsel,2' an executive direc-
tor,22 and supporting staff. The PERB currently is staffed by ninety-
five employees operating out of three regional offices and a headquar-
3540.1(a) and 3541(a) of the EERA, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3540.1(a), 3541(a) (West Supp.
1979), also were amended to read Public Employment Relations Board rather than Educa-
tional Employment Relations Board. 1977 Cal. Stat., ch. 1159, §§ 6, 7, at 3749.
17. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543 (West Supp. 1979).
18. Id §§ 3514.5, 3515.
19. Id §§ 3563, 3565. Unlike SEERA, which did not make clear whether the Gover-
nor was required to make new appointments to the PERB, HEERA clearly provided that no
new appointments to the Board were required by the enactment of HEERA. Section
3562(b) of HEERA provides that "'Board' means the Public Employment Relations Board
established pursuant to subdivision (g) of Section 3513 [of SEERA]." CAL. Gov'T CODE
§ 3562(b) (West Supp. 1979).
20. See note 16 supra. In so structuring the PERB, the legislature might have adopted
one of a wide variety of other board models. These models included: New York's Public
Employment Relations Board, consisting of one full-time chairperson and two part time
members, N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 205(1), (2) (McKinney 1973); New Jersey's tripartite Pub-
lic Employment Relations Commission composed of union, management, and neutral mem-
bers, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.2 (West Supp. 1979-1980) (only chairperson full-time
member); a five member full-time board similar to the National Labor Relations Board, 29
U.S.C. § 153(a) (1976), and California's Agricultural Labor Relations Board, CAL. LAB.
CODE § 1141 (West Supp. 1979); and a board similar to the County of Los Angeles' Em-
ployee Relations Commission, COUNTY OF Los ANGELES ORDINANCE No. 93619, and the
City of Los Angeles' Employee Relations Board, Los ANGELES, CAL., CITY ADMIN. CODE
§ 4.810 (1974), each of whose part time members is appointed from a list of nominees jointly
selected by representatives of management and labor.
21. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3541(e) (West Supp. 1979).
22. Id As amended, California Government Code § 3541(e) provides that the execu-
tive director shall be appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the Board's chairperson.
CAL. Gov'r CODE § 3541(e) (West Supp. 1979). Formerly, the Board itself, then the EERB,
appointed the executive director. See note 16 supra. A grandfather clause prevents the
amended section from becoming operative during the incumbency of the executive director
serving the EERB at the time the amendment became effective on January 1, 1978. CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 3541(0 (West Supp. 1979). Section 3541(f) provides: "The executive direc-
tor and general counsel serving the board on December 31, 1977, shall become employees of
the Public Employment Relations Board and shall continue to serve at the discretion of the
board." The general counsel of the PERB (formerly EERB) always has been appointed by
the Board rather than by the chairperson of the Board.
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ters office in Sacramento.
23
The Powers and Duties of the PERB
The PERB's "rights, powers, duties and responsibilities" are
spelled out in the thirteen subsections of HEERA section 3563.24 The
PERB's powers and duties under HEERA are nearly identical to those
enumerated in.EERA25 and SEERA.26 They may be divided into three
23. [1978] PERB ANN. REP. app. Regional Office Jurisdictions. The PERB's current
proposed budget is $5,084,171. [1979-1980] GOVERNOR'S BUDGET 1070. The PERB has
jurisdiction over 450,000 school and community college employees, 150,000 state civil serv-
ice employees, and 130,000 higher education employees-a total of 730,000 employees. Na-
tionally, California's PERB ranks second in size only to New York's PERB, when measured
by the number of public employees over whom each PERB exercises jurisdiction.
If California's PERB eventually acquires jurisdiction over local government employees
in California's cities and counties, the number of employees under PERB's jurisdiction,
based on state employment data, will increase to an estimated 1,420,000. See STATE OF
CAL. EMPLOYMENT DATA & RESEARCH DIVISION, CAL. LABOR MARKET BULL. 3 (May
1979). A bill providing for this coverage, S.B. 858, was introduced during the 1979 session of
the California Legislature. It passed the Senate by a vote of 21-9, but died in the Public
Employees and Retirement Committee of the Assembly by a vote of 4-4, with one absten-
tion. For a history of that bill, see Recent Developments in California Public Jurisdictions, 41
CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 26 (1979).
24. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3563 (West Supp. 1979).
25. Id § 3541.3. The powers and duties of the PERB are discussed in various places in
the text of this Article. See notes 27-33 & accompanying text infra. PERB's powers are
nearly identical under both HEERA and EERA. The few dissimilarities bear noting.
Under EERA, the PERB is given discretionary power to study, collect, and make available
on request data on employer-employee relations. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3541.3(f) (West Supp.
1979). The description of the PERB's powers and duties under HEERA contains no such
provision. Id § 3563. Also, in describing PERB's powers and duties, HEERA § 3563 does
not contain the requirement found in EERA § 3541.3(f) that the PERB file an annual "re-
port to the Legislature by February 15th of each year on its activities during the immediately
preceding calendar year." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3541.3(f) (West Supp. 1979). SEERA, in
contrast to both HEERA and EERA, contains no distinct description of PERB's powers and
duties. However, § 3513(g) of SEERA, in addition to defining "Board" as the "Public Em-
ployment Relations Board," provides: "The powers and duties of the board described in
Section 3541.3 [of EERA] shall also apply, as appropriate, to this chapter." CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 3513(g) (West Supp. 1979).
It is not clear from the scant legislative history on any of the three statutes why the
Legislature chose to omit the collection of data on employer-employee relations and the
submission of an annual report to the Legislature from the PERB's powers and duties in the
administration of HEERA. It is less clear why the Legislature would encouarge the PERB
to engage in data collection activity even under EERA and SEERA, given the existence of
other agencies in the state government that traditionally have collected and maintained eco-
nomic data of all kinds. The PERB's annual reports make no mention of activity in the area
of discretionary data collection. It thus appears that the PERB has so far exercised its dis-
cretion not to engage in that activity.
26. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3513(g) (West Supp. 1979). See note 25 supra.
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general categories: (1) adjudicatory; (2) administrative and related to
adjudication; and (3) administrative but unrelated to adjudication.
The PERB's adjudicatory authority empowers it to resolve dis-
putes over unfair practices, representation units, and representation
elections arising under the Act. Based on existing administrative rules
implementing EERA, SEERA, and HEERA, the PERB first exercises
this authority by actively encouraging and seeking voluntary resolution
of such disputes.27 Should the parties fail to agree, the PERB assigns a
Board agent to take evidence at a hearing and render a recommended
decision,28 which the parties to the case may accept or appeal to the
PERB. 29 Given the underlying purposes of the statute, it seems evident
that the PERB's most important function in implementing HEERA, as
has been the case in the administration of EERA and SEERA, will be
the resolution of unfair practice and representation disputes.
30
Subsections (f) and (g) of HEERA section 3563 give the PERB
broad administrative powers to establish the procedures required to im-
plement HEERA. Subsection (f) provides PERB with general
rulemaking authority in areas within its jurisdiction. 3' Subsection (g),
written with a narrower focus toward adjudication, authorizes hearings,
the taking of oaths of witnesses, and the issuance of subpoenas, 32 pre-
sumably-although not expressly stated in section 3563-in connection
with any matter within the PERB's jurisdiction. Together, these sub-
sections directly support other HEERA sections authorizing the
PERB's adjudicatory role.33 The remainder of the Article focuses on
this adjudicatory role, emphasizing the impact of existing employer-
employee regulatory statutes on the implementation of HEERA.
27. 8 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 32,600, 33,000 (1978), 51,000 (1979).
28. Id §§ 32,168, 32,170 (1979), 32,215 (1978). 8 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 32,670 (1979),
dealing with unfair practice disputes, provides for an informal settlement conference
designed to narrow issues and explore the possibility of voluntary settlement of the entire
case. 8 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 32,680 (1979), also dealing with unfair practice disputes, pro-
vides for a hearing in the absence of a settlement.
29. 8 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 32,300 (1978).
30. PERB's adjudicatory powers closely parallel those of the National Labor Relations
Board. Compare CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3563(a)-(c), (i), (k) (West Supp. 1979) (representation
and unfair practice authority) with NLRA § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976) (representation and
election matters) and NLRA § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976) (unfair labor practice authority).
31. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3563(f) (West Supp. 1979).
32. Id § 3563(g).
33. Other administrative functions of the PERB, not related to the PERB's adjudica-
tory functions, are discussed at notes 233-35 & accompanying text infra, which address
HEERA's impasse and grievance resolution sections.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31
Representation Questions
Representation questions are those bearing on recognition proce-
dures, campaign and voting procedures for representation elections,
and unit determination. The importance of representation issues and
their prompt resolution is highlighted by HEERA's provision that no
collective bargaining may take place until all disputed representation
questions arising under the Act are resolved, either by agreement of all
parties to the dispute or by a final and unappealed PERB decision.
34
Recognition and certification by PERB are the two general means
by which a union may become the exclusive bargaining representative
of a unit of employees under HEERA, EERA, and SEERA.35 A union
is recognized when an employer grants the union's request to be the
exclusive bargaining representative for a designated unit of employ-
ees.36 Recognition requests must be granted, subject to exceptions in-
volving lack of majority support or a competing claim of
representation.3 7 Certification is achieved when a union petitions the
34. The Act contains no express statement that collective bargaining may not take
place until representation disputes are resolved. This requirement, however, is implicit in
HEERA § 3573, which provides that any employees represented by an exclusive representa-
tive must be "employees of an appropriate unit." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3573 (West Supp.
1979). It follows that the appropriate unit issue must be resolved before a representation
election may be held. Counterpart provisions appear in EERA § 3544(a), CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 3544(a) (West Supp. 1979); in SEERA § 3520.5(a), CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3520.5(a) (West
Supp. 1979); and in NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
35. Under the NLRA, a union may obtain a bargaining order from the NLRB without
an election having been held if an employer's serious unfair practices are found to have
made it not possible for a fair representation election to be conducted and the union demon-
strates majority support through authorization cards. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395
U.S. 375, 595-600 (1969). PERB so far has issued no Gissel-type bargaining orders. The
kinds of unfair practices that could lead to Gissel-type orders are unlikely to arise under
EERA and SEERA and should not be anticipated under HEERA. See note 158 infra.
36. See HEERA §§ 3573-3575, 3577, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3573-3575, 3577 (West
Supp. 1979). EERA procedures for recognition basically are similar to HEERA procedures.
See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3544, 3544.1, 3544.3, 3544.5, 3544.7 (West Supp. 1979). SEERA
recognition procedures are left to the rulemaking discretion of the PERB. See CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 3520.5 (West Supp. 1979). It is unclear why recognition procedures are specified in
EERA and HEERA and left to PERB's discretion in SEERA.
37. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3574(West Supp. 1979). See notes 43-44 & accompanying text
infra. HEERA § 3574(b) provides that a competing claim for representation bars an em-
ployer from recognizing either of the competing unions, thus forcing a representation elec-
tion. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3574(b) (West Supp. 1979). Section 3574(b) has no express
NLRA counterpart; the section is, however, a statement of NLRB decisional law as ex-
pressed in In re Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945). Midwest Piping
held that an employer could not rely on signed membership cards as a basis for granting
recognition to one union where another union also claimed majority status. The Midwest
Piing rationale is that authorization cards are an unreliable indication of a union's majority
status when two or more unions compete for representation, because the extent of dual
January 1980 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
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PERB to organize a representation election which, if won by a union,
will result in the union's certification by the agency as the exclusive
representative of a unit of employees. 38 An employer's denial of a
union's request for recognition can trigger the union's petition for certi-
fication. 39 Both recognition and certification procedures are carefully
balanced to protect the rights of employees who do not wish to be rep-
resented by any union or who desire to be represented by a union other
than the union originally seeking recognition or certification.
40
Recognition, however, avoids both a representation election and
the possibility of a protracted preliminary hearing to resolve a disputed
unit question; it is also the quickest means by which a union might
become a bargaining representative under HEERA. In contrast, the
membership is "an important unknown factor." Id at 1070 n.13. The Midwest Piping doc-
trine is open to criticism because of the inflexible manner in which it is applied. The NLRB
makes no attempt to distinguish multi-union dual-card cases from multi-union cases with no
dual-card issue, yet it does view the dual-card problem as the factor that distinguishes the
single-union case from the multi-union recognition case. Nevertheless, in single-union vol-
untary recognition cases cards are considered reliable indicators of a union's majority status.
It is difficult to distinguish such cases from the multi-union cases with no dual-card issue.
Furthermore, the NLRB itself relies on authorization cards to justify an involuntary bar-
gaining order when serious unfair practices which would influence election results are found
to have been committed by an employer and the union demonstrates its majority status with
authorization cards. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). Under HEERA
§ 3574(b), the PERB must apply the Midwest Piping doctrine inflexibly in all multi-union
recognition cases, those with and those without a dual-card problem. For criticism of the
Midwest Piping doctrine, see Getman, The Midwest Piping Doctrine.- An Example of the Need
for Reappraisal of Labor Board Dogma, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 292 (1964). See also American
Bread Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 147, 155-56 (6th Cir. 1969) (refusing to enforce an NLRB
decision applying the Midwest Piping doctrine); NLRB v. Air Master Corp., 339 F.2d 553,
557 (3d Cir. 1964) (same).
38. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3575, 3577 (West Supp. 1979).
39. HEERA § 3575 sets out the certification procedures to be used by a union following
an employer's refusal to recognize the union as well as certification procedures to be used by
unions originally filing for certification without having first sought recognition. CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 3575 (West Supp. 1979). The option of initially seeking either recognition or certifi-
cation is not provided under EERA. See Alleyne, A Comment on the New Proof-of-Majority
Requirements of the Educational Employment Relations Act, 36 CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEE RELA-
TIONS 16 (1978). HEERA § 3577 sets out PERB's responsibilities after receipt of a union
petition. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3577 (West Supp. 1979).
40. For example, HEERA § 3577 expressly provides that a representation ballot shall
contain the choice of "no representation." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3577 (West Supp. 1979).
This portion of HEERA was derived from EERA § 3544.7, CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3544.7
(West Supp. 1979). SEERA § 3520.5(b) makes election procedures subject to PERB's
rulemaking discretion. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3520.5(b) (West Supp. 1979). The PERB has
published rules governing SEERA representation elections, see 8 CAL. ADMIN. CODE
§§ 41,200-41,270 (1978), but these rules do not specifically require the ballot to contain a "no
representation" choice. Intervention rights protect the interests of employees who seek rep-
resentation by a union other than the union seeking recognition or certification. See, e.g.,
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3574(b) (West Supp. 1979).
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road to certification may be slow and tumultuous if complex represen-
tation disputes precede the election.4' Because an employer's obliga-
tion to bargain begins with the employer's recognition of a union or the
union's certification as the exclusive representative, the statutory proce-
dures for achieving recognition and certification warrant special atten-
tion.
Recognition Procedures
If a union seeks to become recognized, it must file a recognition
request with the employer and simultaneously file proof of the union's
majority support with the PERB or a third party mutually agreed upon
by the employer and the union seeking recognition.42 These proce-
41. In the absence of recognition or a consent-election agreement resolving unit or
other disputed representation questions, a hearing is held before a PERB hearing officer who
writes a recommended decision, any part of which may be appealed to the PERB. See 8
CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 33,270 (1978), 33,330 (1979) (EERA), 41,071, 41,140 (1978)
(SEERA), 51,140, 51,225 (1979) (HEERA), 32,168, 32,170 (1979), 32,215, 32,300 (1978) (gen-
eral).
On the basis of the PERB's performance under EERA and SEERA, it can take from
one to two years for the PERB to decide representation cases that are not settled by recogni-
tion or other agreements. For example, SEERA became effective on July 1, 1978. Requests
for recognition were filed during August and September of 1978. Unit requests under
SEERA differed and could not be harmonized. One phase of the hearings to resolve the
differing unit contentions, concerning the scope of the unit, began on December 19, 1978,
and ended on May 16, 1979. The other phase, concerning who might be excluded from the
unit as a supervisory, managerial, or confidential employee, began on January 13, 1979. The
20,000-page record made in the case was submitted directly to the PERB members without
an intervening hearing officer's decision, an unusual step for a quasi-judicial administrative
agency. While bypassing a hearing officer's recommended decision appears to be a time-
saving measure, the time used by PERB members to cope with issues that might not have
been appealed from a hearing officer's decision could very well make the decision to bypass
the hearing officer's decision a time-losing decision. The prevailing practice of parties to
unit disputes is to appeal the decision on the scope of the unit and not to appeal hearing
officer decisions on all supervisory, managerial, and confidential employee issues.
As matters stand at this writing, the PERB itself will decide the portion of the unit case
concerning the scope of the unit, but not the issue of who might be excluded as a supervi-
sory, managerial, or confidential employee. A representation election will then be held.
Some voters will probably be challenged on the ground that their supervisory, managerial,
or confidential status makes them ineligible to vote. It will subsequently be determined
whether the challenged ballots are determinative of the outcome of the election. If the chal-
lenged ballots are determinative of the outcome, all of the issues raised by those ballots will
have to be resolved by the PERB before election results may be certified by the PERB. This
could extend the time of certification of election results until July of 1980 and possibly into
early 1981. Telephone Interview with Charles M. Cole, Executive Director, PERB (Sept. 19,
1979).
42. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3573, 3575 (West Supp. 1979). EERA § 3544, originally re-
quiring that proof of a union's majority support be submitted to the employer, has been
amended to require submission of such proof to the PERB instead. CAL. GOVT CODE
January 1980
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dures precipitate important questions concerning the extent of an em-
ployer's discretion to deny a request for recognition and trigger an
election or a unit hearing, or both, in lieu of recognition.
HEERA's section on recognition requires that an employer recog-
nize a union on request unless at least one or more of six conditions is
met.4 3 Two of these conditions bear on the employer's state of mind at
the time the recognition request is made: "The higher education em-
ployer shall grant a request for recognition . . . unless . . .[t]he em-
ployer reasonably doubts that the employee organization has majority
support or reasonably doubts the appropriateness of the requested
unit."4 In adopting this language, the legislature appears to have de-
parted sharply from EERA's recognition procedures, which permit an
employer to deny a recognition request for any reason.4 5 This depar-
ture from EERA procedures apparently has incorporated the earlier
and no longer followed approach of the NLRB in In re Joy Silk Mills,
Inc. ,46 which obligated an employer to recognize a union on request
§ 3544 (West Supp. 1979). HEERA and EERA now differ in that HEERA § 3573, unlike
EERA § 3544, provides a union with the possibility of submitting proof of majority support
to a neutral third party rather than to the PERB. The requirement that the neutral third
party be "mutually agreed upon" means, however, that the employer may veto that possibil-
ity. See generally Alleyne, A Comment on the New Proof-of-Majority Requirements of the
Educational Employment Relations Act, 36 CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 16 (1978).
43. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3574 (West Supp. 1979).
44. Id § 3574(a). The other four conditions which exempt an employer from recogniz-
ing a union upon request occur where: (1) "Another employee organization. . . files with
the employer a challenge to the appropriateness of the unit. . . within 15 workdays of the
posting of notice of the written request," id § 3574(b); (2) "ja]nother employee organization
• ..submits a competing claim of representation within 15 workdays of the posting of no-
tice of the written request," Id; (3) "[tlhere is currently in effect a lawful written memoran-
dum of understanding between the employer and another employee organization recognized
or certified as the exclusive representative of any employees included in the unit described in
the request for recognition," id § 3574(c); or (4) "[w]ithin the previous 12 months either
another employee organization has been lawfully recognized or certified as the exclusive
representative of any employees included in the unit described in the request for recognition,
or a majority of votes case in a representation election . . . were cast for 'no representa-
tion,'" id § 3574(d).
45. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3544.1(a) (West Supp. 1979). Section 3544.1(a) provides that
the public school employer need not grant recognition if the employer desires a representa-
tion election or doubts the appropriateness of the unit. Under HEERA § 3574 an employer
may not trigger an election in lieu of recognition simply by requesting a representation elec-
tion. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3574 (West Supp. 1979). HEERA § 3574 also differs from com-
parable EERA § 3544.1(a) in that the former requires "reasonab[le] doubt," rather than
merely "doubt," concerning the appropriateness of a union's requested unit. The difference
appears to be more form than substance, as measured by the quantum of proof required to
establish one standard rather than the other.
46. 85 N.L.R.B. 1263, 1264 (1949), a]J'd, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341
U.S. 914 (1951).
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unless the employer had a good faith doubt that the union had majority
support.47 Reasons for the departure are not made clear by anything
found in HEERA itself. Nonetheless, the legislature, in making these
changes, has made it much more difficult for a HEERA employer to
deny a single union's request for recognition than it is for a public
school employer to deny such a request under EERA. In virtually all
other respects, however, the recognition provisions in EERA and
HEERA are similar.
In summary, under HEERA, an employer's denial of recognition
can trigger one of two responses by a union seeking recognition: a "pe-
tition for certification," which ordinarily would lead to a representation
election;48 or an unfair practice charge under section 357149 alleging an
unlawful refusal to recognize the union seeking recognition, which
could lead to a Joy Silk Mills type of bargaining order.50 Either the
petition for certification or the unfair practice charge would be filed
with the PERB.
Certification Procedures
Confronted with a HEERA employer who is unwilling for valid
reasons to recognize the union upon request, a union seeking to become
the exclusive representative of employees must attempt to do so under
HEERA's certification procedures. 51 On receiving a petition for certifi-
cation, the PERB must determine whether the petition meets the statu-
tory requisites for an election, resolve any pre-election disputes raised
by the petition, and, if in order, conduct an election to determine
47. Modifying its Joy Silk Mills decision, the NLRB in Aaron Brothers Co., 158
N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966), held that "[a]bsent a showing of bad faith, an employer will not be
held to have violated his bargaining obligation under the law simply because he refuses to
rely upon cards, rather than an election, as the method for determining the union's major-
ity." Id at 1078. The effect of Aaron Brothers was to relieve the employer of the burden of
proof. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 592-94 (1969). In GisselPacking, the
United States Supreme Court noted: "[T]he Board announced at oral argument that it had
virtually abandoned the Joy Silk doctrine altogether. Under the Board's current practice, an
employer's good faith doubt is largely irrelevant, and the key to the issuance of a bargaining
order is the commission of serious unfair labor practices that interfere with the election
processes and tend to preclude the holding of a fair election. Thus, an employer can insist
that a union go to an election, regardless of his subjective motivation, so long as he is not
guilty of misconduct. . . ." Id at 594.
48. See note 41 supra.
49. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3571 (West Supp. 1979).
50. Allegations of unlawful refusal to recognize could provide the basis for a Joy Silk
Mills type of bargaining order, however, the Joy Silk Mills rationale apparently has been
virtually abandoned elsewhere. See notes 46-47 & accompanying text supra.
51. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3575 (West Supp. 1979).
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whether employees in the "appropriate unit" desire to be represented
by a union or desire "no representation." 52 Experience under EERA
portends that among the various types of pre-election disputes that
must be resolved before an election is held under HEERA, unit contro-
versies will far exceed all others in number and importance.
5 3
Unit Determination
A representation unit is a grouping of job classifications. The
function of a unit determination proceeding is to determine which
grouping of job classifications is "appropriate" under the applicable
statutory unit criteria for collective bargaining. The importance of unit
determination cannot be overemphasized. The selection of an "appro-
priate" unit not only determines which classes of employees are eligible
to vote in the election, but also predetermines the constituency the
union will exclusively represent should the union win the election. The
outcome of the representation election may hinge on the outcome of
the unit determination, just as the outcome of a political election might
hinge on the results of a gerrymander. Consequently, unit determina-
tion arguments made by parties to the determination proceeding, al-
though at times couched in the dry terms of applicable statutory
criteria, often have as their real objective approval of a unit configura-
tion most likely to produce a representation election victory.
Unit determination controversies, including those under HEERA,
may be classified as (1) disputes over the geographical boundaries of a
unit; (2) disputes over the classes of employees to be included in a unit;
and (3) disputes concerning the particular employees to be included in
the generic class or classes of employees making up a unit. Thus, under
HEERA, the question of whether a unit should be statewide or be lim-
ited to a single campus would represent a boundary dispute. The ques-
tion of whether faculty and librarians should be in the same unit would
represent a class inclusion dispute. On a determination that a unit con-
sisting of faculty, but excluding librarians, is an appropriate unit, the
question of whether a department head should be excluded from the
unit because he or she is a supervisor within the meaning of HEERA
would represent an individual inclusion dispute.
Moreover, some unit disputes involve two or all three types of con-
troversies. A unit controversy involving more than one classification
might exist, for example, where Union A petitioned for a unit com-
52. Id § 3577(a).
53. Seegeneral [1976] EERB ANN. REP.
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prised of faculty from one campus, while Union B filed a competing
petition for a statewide unit of librarians and faculty. All three types of
unit issues would be involved if the university employer contended that
the appropriate unit should be a statewide unit of faculty and librarians
and that Union A's proposed unit inappropriately included the head of
the English Department, an alleged supervisor within the meaning of
HEERA's "supervisory employee" definition.5 4 This classification of
unit determination disputes is important in two respects. First, differ-
ent unit criteria tend to be applied to units falling in the different classi-
fications. Second, the speed with which the PERB can decide unit
controversies will vary with the differing character of the unit contro-
versy.
The Influence of NLRA Unit Criteria
NLRA unit determination standards are not readily apparent on
reading the NLRA itself because Congress gave the NLRB virtually
complete power to establish NLRA unit criteria and to determine how
they should be applied.:5 Nonetheless, HEERA's unit determination
criteria are simply NLRA criteria, as developed by the NLRB and the
courts, tailored slightly to fit California's higher education system. The
NLRA-based origins of HEERA's unit criteria provide a threshold ba-
sis for their interpretation, as California courts, by a combination of
pronouncement and practice, have virtually commanded that federal
labor law precedents be followed in the interpretation of state labor
relations legislation that is patterned after federal legislation.56 The
54. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3580.3 (West Supp. 1979).
55. NLRA § 9(b) provides: "The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to
assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the
unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft
unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof.. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976). See notes 57-58 &
accompanying text infra.
56. In Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 526 P.2d 971, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 507 (1974), the California Supreme Court held that it is appropriate to use National
Labor Relations Act precedents as a guide in interpreting analogous or identical language in
state labor legislation. Id at 617, 526 P.2d at 977, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 513. In Los Angeles
Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 54 Cal. 2d 684, 355 P.2d 905,
8 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1960), the California Supreme Court held: "When legislation has been judi-
cially construed and a subsequent statute on the same or an analogous subject is framed in
the identical language, it will ordinarily be presumed that the Legislature intended that the
language as used in the later enactment would be given a like interpretation. This rule is
applicable to state statutes which are patterned after federal statutes." Id at 688, 355 P.2d at
907, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 3.
Following the reasoning of Vallejo and Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority,
California appellate courts consistently have followed NLRB and federal court interpreta-
tions of the National Labor Relations Act in interpreting California collective bargaining
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NLRA origins of HEERA's unit criteria thus are an essential key to
their understanding.
The original NLRA did not establish workable unit criteria. In-
stead, the 1935 Act provided that the NLRB shall decide whether the
appropriate unit shall be the "employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or
subdivision thereof. '57 This statutory enumeration embraced every
possible unit configuration and gave the NLRB no more guidance than
the Act would have provided in the absence of such language. Little
more guidance was provided by the NLRA's command that the appro-
priate unit shall "assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising
the rights guaranteed by [the Act]."
'58
Working with carte blanche authority not only to determine units
but also to establish the criteria to be employed in making the determi-
nation, the NLRB over the years has fashioned two principal unit crite-
ria: (1) community of interest, including the subcriteria that make up
the elements of community of interest; and (2) past bargaining his-
tory. 59 These criteria have found their way into HEERA as part of a
detailed listing of criteria which must be considered in "each case
where the appropriateness of a unit is an issue."
'60
In addition to the NLRA-based unit criteria, which the PERB has
discretion to apply in virtually any reasonable fashion, HEERA's unit
criteria contain specific and unqualified unit inclusions and exclu-
sions61 and specific but rebuttable presumptions in favor of certain unit
statutes. See, e.g., Santa Clara County Dist. Attorney Investigators Ass'n v. County of Santa
Clara, 51 Cal. App. 3d 255, 124 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1975); Alameda County Assistant Pub. De-
fenders Ass'n v. County of Alameda, 33 Cal. App. 3d 825, 109 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1973).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976).
58. Id
59. See generally R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING 68-72 (1976).
60. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3579(a) (West Supp. 1979). HEERA also follows § 9(b) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976), under which the NLRB's discretion to determine the
scope of units is limited by a proviso added by the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947. The
proviso expressly removes the NLRB's authority to approve certain proposed units: (1) units
that include both professional and nonprofessional employees (unless the professional em-
ployees consent to the inclusion of nonprofessionals); and (2) units that include both guards
and employees who are not guards. Id
61. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3579(d) (West Supp. 1979). Section 3579(d) provides that
skilled craft employees have the right to be included in separate craft units. This is an
apparent legislative response to the PERB's decision in Sacramento City Unified School
Dist., I P.E.R.C. 419 (1977), disallowing a separate craft unit. In that case, the PERB also
denied a motion to reconsider its decision, even though no party to the case opposed the
motion and a voluntary settlement of the craft-unit dispute appeared to be imminent. See
Sacramento City Unified School Dist., 1 P.E.R.C. 475 (1977) (Motion for Reconsideration).
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configurations. 62 The NLRA and HEERA are not parallel with respect
to all specific unit inclusions and exclusions. One example of a specific
HEERA limitation on the PERB's discretion, contrasting markedly
with NLRB precedents, is HEERA's treatment of the well-litigated is-
sue of whether law, medical, and other professional school faculty are
entitled to separate units.
The NLRB, by applying community of interest criteria, has held
that law school and medical school faculties may be appropriately
organized as separate units.63 HEERA's unit criteria, however, provide
62. HEERA § 3579(b) creates a rebuttable presumption that professional and nonpro-
fessional employees "shall not be included in the same representation unit." CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 3579(b) (West Supp. 1979). The presumption in § 3579(b) is expressly made rebut-
table on the basis of community of interest, history of representation, and other general unit
criteria enumerated in HEERA § 3579(a). CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3579(a) (West Supp. 1979).
It seems that satisfaction of the general unit criteria found in § 3579(a) might overcome the
presumption and permit the approval of a mixed unit of professional and nonprofessional
employees. HEERA's treatment of professional and nonprofessional employees thus ap-
pears to differ from NLRA treatment of the subject, since the NLRA presumption against a
mixed professional and nonprofessional employee unit, absent consent of a majority of the
professional employees, in effect, is irrebuttable. See note 60 supra. However, the differ-
ences between NLRA and HEERA treatment of professional employee units may be more
apparent than real.
HEERA § 3562(o) defines "professional employee" in part as "[amny employee engaged
in work . . . predominantly intellectual and varied in character as opposed to routine
mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work[,] . . . involving the consistent exercise of
discretion and judgment in its performance[,]... and.. . requiring knowledge of an ad-
vanced type... customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual in-
struction . . . . [and any] employee who . . . has completed courses of specialized
intellectual instruction and study. . . and. . . is performing related work under the super-
vision of a professional person to qualify himself to become a professional employee .. "
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3562(o) (West Supp. 1979). Given this definition of "professional em-
ployee," it is difficult to perceive how the presumption against a mixed professional-nonpro-
fessional employee unit might be rebutted. Few, if any, professional employees under the
jurisdiction of HEERA will be found to have a community of interest with nonprofessional
employees that is sufficient to rebut the presumption against the mixed unit. Nor is it likely
that consideration of general unit criteria other than community of interest-such as unit
fragmentation, employer efficiency, and effect on the meet and confer bargaining process-
will very often serve to overcome the presumption against a mixed unit of professional and
nonprofessional employees. Indeed, consideration of the criterion of the unit composition's
effect on the meet-and-confer process very likely will support the presumption against the
mixed unit. A unit made up of professional and nonprofessional employees working under
widely differing employment conditions, and hence having widely divergent bargaining in-
terests, would adversely affect the bargaining process.
63. See University of Vermont & State Agricultural College, 223 N.L.R.B. 423 (1976);
University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634 (1974); University of San Francisco, 207 N.L.R.B. 12
(1973); Catholic Univ., 201 N.L.R.B. 929 (1973). In these cases, the NLRB's community of
interest findings calling for separate law or medical school units included findings of sepa-
rate buildings, unequal salaries, differing promotion and tenure periods, operational auton-
omy, and an intellectual alignment with practitioners. Public sector decisions involving
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in part that "the only appropriate representation units including mem-
bers of the academic senate of the University of California shall be
either a single statewide unit consisting of all eligible members of the
senate, or divisional units consisting of all eligible members of a divi-
sion of the senate."' 64 Thus, even though separate units of law and
medical school faculties at the University of California undoubtedly
would be deemed appropriate under the community of interest criteria
of both the NLRB and HEERA,65 HEERA section 3579(e) clearly
makes inappropriate any University of California academic unit with a
boundary encompassing less than one campus.
66
For other than University of California academic senate members,
however, the initial question of whether a HEERA unit may be state-
wide, campus-wide, or a campus subdivision, is as open as it would be
under the decisional law of the NLRB. Because no specific HEERA
unit criterion will govern this initial issue, the question should be re-
solved on the basis of the general unit criteria found in HEERA section
3579.67 NLRB decisions may be instructive in this initial unit determi-
nation, but they should be viewed with caution because of the inconsis-
tent manner in which the NLRB has applied its criteria to unit
boundary disputes at private universities and colleges.
In 1970, the NLRB decided Cornell University,68 its seminal multi-
public universities and colleges tend to follow the NLRB cases. See, e.g., American Ass'n of
Univ. Professors v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Neb., 198 Neb. 243, 253 N.W.2d 1
(1977). In New York Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 4 (1973), and Syracuse Univ., 204 N.L.R.B. 641
(1973), the NLRB permitted law faculties to decide whether or not they wanted separate
representation units. See generally Moore, The Determination of Bargaining Unitsfor College
Faculties, 37 U. Prir. L. REV. 43, 60-62 (1975); Pollitt & Thompson, Collective Bargaining on
the Campus:. A Survey Five Years After Cornell, I INDUs. REL. L.J. 191, 212-14 (1976).
64. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3579(e) (West Supp. 1979).
65. Id § 3579(a)(1).
66. See id § 3579(e).
67. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3579(a)(d) (West Supp. 1979). For academic senate members
of the University of California, but for no other HEERA employees, Government Code
§ 3579(e) provides that "the only appropriate representation units including members of the
academic senate . . . shall be either a single state-wide unit consisting of all eligible mem-
bers of the senate or divisional units consisting of all eligible members of a division of the
senate." Id. § 3579(e). A "division" of the senate is a campus component of the state-wide
senate. Since both the campus and state-wide units are defined as "appropriate," id., a peti-
tion for a campus unit of academic employees could not be challenged successfully on the
grounds that a campus unit is not appropriate within the meaning of Government Code
§ 3579(a). Further, § 3579(e) permits a petition for a University of California state-wide
academic unit when 35% of eligible members of the senate are represented by one or more
unions. Then, the issue of representation in a system-wide unit would be determined by
state-wide senate members in a PERB-conducted election.
68. 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).
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facility university and college unit case, in which it held the general
unit criteria used in industrial unit disputes applicable in determining
the appropriate unit in university and college disputes. These criteria
included "prior bargaining history, centralization of management par-
ticularly in regard to labor relations, extent of employee interchange,
degree of interdependence or autonomy of the plants, differences or
similarities in skills and functions of employees, and geographical loca-
tion of the facilities in relation to each other."' 69 The NLRB concluded
a statewide unit was appropriate.
70
With the exception of the geographic criterion, all of these criteria
are employed by the NLRB in class-inclusion as well as unit boundary
disputes.7 1 In unit boundary and class-inclusion unit decisions, how-
ever, the NLRB tends to apply the unit criteria without stating which of
the numerous criteria are being given more weight than others, and
why. Instead, it merely recites all of the applicable criteria, notes the
relevant facts, and states a conclusion. This is particularly the case in
regard to the various community of interest subcriteria.
72
This lack of a priority ranking of criteria and subcriteria may be
partially responsible for the inconsistency in the NLRB's approach to
these cases. For example, in 1973 the NLRB decided another case in-
volving Cornell University,73 but concluded there that "something less
than the statewide unit. . . may be appropriate. ' 74 The NLRB based
its decision on the "considerable geographic diversity among Cornell's
various facilities and considerable distance between many of them...
[and the] minimal degree of interchange of employees. '75 Conse-
quently, the Board found that a unit comprised of dining services em-
ployees on one campus was appropriate.76 The NLRB, although
noting Cornell's centralized employment and labor relations policies,
uniform wage rates, and other uniform benefits, did not consider these
factors controlling.77 In Tulane University,78 however, the NLRB
69. Id at 336.
70. Id
71. Compare NLRB v. Retail Clerks Local 588, 587 F.2d 984, 987-88 (9th Cir. 1978)
and Pacific Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir. 1978) (class-inclu-
sion unit dispute) with Local 627, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 844,
848, 849 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1979) and Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 101 L.R.R.M. 2864, 2868
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (unit boundary dispute).
72. See notes 102-04 & accompanying text infra.
73. Cornell Univ., 202 N.L.R.B. 290 (1973).
74. Id at 291.
75. Id
76. Id at 292.
77. Id at 291.
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found a unit of nonacademic employees from one university appropri-
ate, relying on centralized personnel policies, identical job titles
throughout the University, and uniform wages and fringe benefits79-
the same factors considered not controlling in the 1973 Cornell Univer-
siy case. Further, the facts in Tulane University showed geographic
diversity and a lack of interchange or transfer of employees between
Tulane's facilities-controlling factors in the 1973 Cornell University
case 8O-yet the Board did not find a single-campus unit appropriate.
Although the NLRB's near ten-year history of unit determination
in private college and university cases may prove useful in determining
how individual HEERA unit criteria might be interpreted, the inconsis-
tency of the NLRB's approach in these cases decreases the usefulness of
NLRB decisions in HEERA unit determination controversies. More-
over, the specificity with which HEERA's unit criteria are written does
not solve the problem. Although HEERA requires the PERB to con-
sider all of HEERA's unit criteria in "each case where the appropriate-
ness of a unit in an issue," 8' the act does not suggest which of its unit
criteria should be given more weight than others. This shortcoming
compounds the difficulty of finding a principled basis on which to de-
cide unit disputes.
The need for weighting various unit criteria would not exist if each
of the unit criteria rationally could be given equal weight in all cases.
To adopt this approach, however, would sometimes place different unit
criteria in conflict with each other. For example, in a single unit deter-
mination proceeding, community of interest evidence, viewed alone,
might favor multiple units; evidence on unit size, as related to efficiency
of operations, might favor fewer units than the number suggested by
the community of interest criterion; and bargaining history evidence,
alone, might dictate still another result. Hence, a principled applica-
tion of unit criteria requires that some criteria be given priority. Simi-
lar problems may arise with community of interest subcriteria, as
illustrated by the apparently different priorities of subcritieria applied
in the NLRB's Tulane Universily and 1973 Cornell University deci-
sions. 82
78. 195 N.L.R.B. 329 (1972).
79. Id at 330.
80. See notes 73-77 & accompanying text supra.
81. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3579(a) (West Supp. 1979).
82. See notes 68-80 & accompanying text supra.
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Suggested Priority Ranking of HEERA Unit Criteria
The NLRA's preamble speaks of employee concerns such as "ine-
quality of bargaining power between employees.. . and employers"
and the need to provide "protection. . . of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively. '83 HEERA's preamble provides that
HEERA's purpose is to "assure. . . an atmosphere which permits the
fullest participation by employees in the determination of conditions of
employment which affect them" 84 and that this purpose is to be
achieved by "providing a uniform basis for recognizing the right of the
employees . . . to full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of
representation . *... ,85
Despite these similar purposes, in the enumeration of unit criteria
and statutory objectives, HEERA and the NLRA appear to differ.
NLRA unit criteria are phrased almost exclusively in terms of em-
ployee rights. The NLRB is commanded to make unit determinations
that "assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights
guaranteed by [the NLRA]. '8 6 HEERA's unit criteria, in contrast, ex-
83. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
84. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3560(e) (West Supp. 1979). Similar language appears in
EERA, id § 3540, and SEERA, id § 3525. EERA's statement of purpose contains the addi-
tional statement that "[nlothing contained herein shall be deemed to supersede other provi-
sions of the Education Code and the rules and regulations of public school employers which
establish and regulate tenure or a merit or civil service system or which provide for other
methods of administering employer-employee relations, so long as the rules and regulations
or other methods of the public school employer do not conflict with lawful collective agree-
ments." Id § 3540. Likewise, SEERA's "purpose and intent" provision states: "Nothing
contained herein shall be deemed to supersede the provisions of existing state law which
establish and regulate a merit or civil service system or which provide for other methods of
administering employer-employee relations." Id § 3525. In the absence of determinative
case law, it is too early to say how California courts will harmonize these provisos, which
limit the bargaining process, with the stated objectives of EERA and SEERA and the bar-
gaining process generally. In other states, the trend of the decisions is in favor of sustaining
the position which supports the viability of the collective bargaining statute. At this juncture
in the development of California's three major public employment collective bargaining
statutes, it is sufficient to note that HEERA's statement of purpose contains no proviso re-
quiring that HEERA be harmonized with another statute. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3561
(West Supp. 1979). In this respect, the difference separating HEERA from SEERA and
EERA undoubtedly has its basis in the constitutional autonomy of the University of Califor-
nia. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 9. A HEERA proviso, however, does protect the functions of
the University of California's and the California State University and Colleges' Academic
Senates and other "shared governance mechanisms or practices." CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 3561(b) (West Supp. 1979).
85. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3560(e) (West Supp. 1979).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976).
January 1980 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
pressly require that the PERB consider employer interests. 87 Employee
interests are not mentioned, although they are strongly implied in the
general community of interest and bargaining history criteria.
The priority of statutory objectives also must be implied, as
HEERA does not expressly state all of its necessary objectives. In this
regard, the primacy of stable bargaining relationships as an objective of
unit determination is implicit not only in HEERA's preamble, 88 but
also in California's common law policy against public employee
strikes89 and in HEERA's attempt to substitute impasse resolution pro-
cedures for the right to strike.90 Consequently, bargaining history and
community of interest criteria should be regarded as critical criteria,
because both criteria have a substantial bearing on the statutory objec-
tive of a stable bargaining relationship. This does not mean that such
HEERA unit criteria as the ability of the "employer representatives to
deal effectively with employee organizations," 91 the "numerical size of
the unit,"92 the "effect of the proposed unit on efficient operations of
the employer, '93 or the "number of employees and classifications in a
proposed unit" 94 are unimportant and should not be taken into account
in unit disputes. It does mean that the impact of these criteria on the
goal of a stable bargaining relationship generally will be less than that
of the community of interest and bargaining history criteria. Addition-
ally, some of the former criteria are mere redundant statements of other
more important criteria95 and others are of little use for other reasons. 96
87. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3579(a) (West Supp. 1979).
88. Id § 3560(a). "The people of the State of California have a fundamental interest in
the development of harmonious and cooperative labor relations between public institutions
of higher education and their employees." Id
89. Public employee strikes in California have been held to be illegal even in the ab-
sence of a statute making them illegal. See Pasadena Unified School Dist. v. Pasadena Fed.
of Teachers, 72 Cal. App. 3d 100, 105-07, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41, 44-45 (1977); Los Angeles
Unified School Dist. v. United Teachers, 24 Cal. App. 3d 142, 145-46, 100 Cal. Rptr. 806,
808 (1972). But see San Diego Teachers Ass'n v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 1,593 P.2d 838,
154 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1979), discussed in note 216 infra.
90. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3590-3594 (West Supp. 1979).
91. Id § 3579(a)(2).
92. Id
93. Id § 3579(a)(3).
94. Id. § 3579(a)(4).
95. The following sections of HEERA unit criteria are redundancies: "The effect of the
proposed unit on efficient operations of the employer," id § 3579(a)(3); "[a] number of em-
ployees and classifications in a proposed unit, and its effect on the operations of the em-
ployer," id § 3579(a)(4); "[tlhe impact on the meet and confer relationship created by
fragmentation of employee groups or any proliferation of units among the employees of the
employer," id § 3579(a)(5).
The requirement in HEERA § 3579(a)(5), CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3579(a)(5) (West Supp.
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Consequently, the following ranking of unit criteria considers only bar-
gaining history, community of interest, efficient operations, and the ex-
tent to which employees belong to the same organization.
Bargaining History
Bargaining history, because it indicates the type of bargaining re-
lationship that in fact exists, is the best evidence of whether a particular
unit determination will promote a stable bargaining relationship. For
instance, evidence may show that employees have organized, chosen a
bargaining representative, and bargained successfully through that rep-
resentative. Conversely, bargaining history might suggest that the ulti-
mate objectives of the collective bargaining statute have not been
fulfilled for reasons attributable in whole or in part to an existing unit
configuration. Thus, bargaining history, if it exists under a collective
bargaining statute, should predominate over other unit criteria.
The importance of bargaining history as a unit criterion requires
one qualification. Only bargaining history that existed under a collec-
tive bargaining statute authorizing genuine collective bargaining by ex-
clusive representatives for identifiable units should be given serious
consideration. More specifically, this means that the "history of em-
ployee representation with the employer," as described in HEERA sec-
tion 3579(a)(1), 97 should apply only to "history" under HEERA.
Differences between the administration of employer-employee relations
under a collective bargaining statute and relations existing indepen-
dently of such a statute are so great that, for unit determination pur-
1979), that the PERB consider the effect that the proposed unit will have on the meet and
confer relationship does not materially differ from the community of interest, history of
employee representation, and other criteria found in HEERA § 3579(a)(l)-(4), CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 3579(a)(l)-(4) (West Supp. 1979). Implicitly, the latter criteria have as their objec-
tive an effective bargaining relationship. This is consistent with the purpose and intent of
HEERA as expressed in its preamble. See notes 84-85 & accompanying text supra.
96. First, the "numerical size of the unit" is too obscure to be useful. This criterion
might mean the number of employees in the unit, in which case it is superfluous. If numeri-
cal size does not mean the number of employees in the unit, its meaning is unclear, as the
size of the unit can be measured only by the number of employees in the unit or the number
ofjob classifications in the unit. A unit may have a small number ofjob classifications and a
large number of employees, or a large number of job classifications and a relatively small
number of employees.
Second, the "number of employees.., in a proposed unit" may not be applied ration-
ally if other unit criteria are given effect. If a proposed unit consists of a single job classifica-
tion with large numbers of employees, each one performing similar kinds of work under
similar working conditions, community of interest criteria ought to dictate that the number
of employees in the unit becomes irrelevant, particularly in determining whether the unit
should be subdivided.
97. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3579(a) (West Supp. 1979).
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poses, pre-HEERA employer-employee relations history should be
given minimal weight in unit determination proceedings.98
Community of Interest
Community of interest criteria are evidence of the kind of bargain-
ing relationship that might exist and thus operate as a predictive test.
Accordingly, these criteria ought to be ranked behind bargaining his-
tory in a priority ranking of unit criteria. In the absence of bargaining
history, however, community of interest stands as the most reliable in-
dication of a unit's ability to further the objectives of HEERA.
There is a direct relationship between the extent of employment-
related differences among various classes of employees in a single unit
and the potential for inter-classification conflicts that might impede
bargaining-as the number of classes with varying characteristics
grows, so does the potential for detrimental inter-classification con-
98. PERB's treatment of this issue under EERA has been inconsistent. In its first unit
decision, Sweetwater Union High School Dist., I P.E.R.C. 10 (1976), the PERB determined
that "[b]ecause of the unspecified and possibly unilateral nature of the unit designation pro-
cedure which existed in this district under the Winton Act [CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 13080-
13088 (West Supp. 1968-1969) (repealed July 1, 1976)], in determining appropriate negotiat-
ing units in this case we give little weight to 'established practices' as they relate to the
composition of the unit represented under the authority of [the EERA]." I P.E.R.C. at 11.
Subsequent PERB unit decisions generally have followed the Sweetwater holding. See, e.g.,
Los Angeles Unified School Dist., I P.E.R.C. 18 (1976). But in a sharp and unexplained
departure from Sweetwater, the PERB in San Mateo Union High School Dist., 2 P.E.R.C.
2074 (1978), relied on ten years of history predating EERA, among other factors, in denying
a request for a separate craft unit. It is submitted that the PERB's reliance on pre-EERA
history in San Mateo was erroneous. Neither collective bargaining, exclusive representa-
tion, nor unit criteria existed under the Winton Act. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 13080-13088
(West Supp. 1968-1969) (repealed July 1, 1976). Thus, under the Winton Act, a school dis-
trict was not obligated to attempt to negotiate or reach an agreement in good faith with any
union and was free to recognize any number of employee organizations for meet and confer
purposes.
Further, the existence of a "voluntary" school district-union relationship under the
Winton Act usually was not consensual-it existed in most instances because the union had
little choice other than to accede to the desires of the school district. Under EERA, in con-
trast, when efforts at voluntary agreement in unit disputes fail, the controversy becomes a
disputed case for resolution by the PERB; the possibility of an adverse PERB unit decision
gives EERA unit agreements a consensual characteristic generally not achievable under the
Winton Act.
Employers and employees covered by HEERA previously were covered by the Brown
Act, which specifically no longer applies to them. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3526(b) (West Supp.
1979). The Brown Act resembles the Winton Act, in that no collective bargaining is author-
ized and no units are defined or authorized. Consequently, the same limitations exist in
relying on bargaining history under the Brown Act as a basis for HEERA unit determina-
tion as exist in relying on bargaining history under the Winton Act for EERA unit determi-
nation.
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fficts.99 If inter-classification conflicts would impede bargaining based
on a proposed multi-classification unit, it then must be determined
what subdivisions within the proposed multi-classification unit would
meet the community of interest standard.
HEERA section 3579(a)(1) provides that the PERB, in determin-
ing an appropriate unit, shall take into consideration several commu-
nity of interest subcriteria:
The internal and occupational community of interest among the em-
ployees, including, but not limited to, the extent to which they per-
form functionally related services or work toward established
common goals, the history of employee representation with the em-
ployer, the extent to which such employees belong to the same organ-
ization, the extent to which the employees have common skills,
working conditions, job duties, or similar educational or training re-
quirements, and the extent to which the employees have common
supervision.1°
HEERA section 3579(a)(1) is virtually a statutory restatement of
NLRB decisional law on community of interest. 10' Hence, unit deter-
minations under HEERA likely will suffer from many of the problems
found in NLRB community of interest decisions.
Compounding the problem created by the NLRB's failure to give
unit criteria a priority ranking is the absence of a priority ranking for
community of interest subcriteria. As a result, the NLRB's unit deter-
mination decisions that are based on community of interest grounds
tend to suffer from a lack of guiding rationale. Typically, they deline-
ate community of interest subcriteria, outline the essential facts re-
quired for a decision, and then state a conclusion without attempting to
suggest which of the subcriteria influenced the decision and why other
subcriteria did not.
In Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp.,1 °2 one of the NLRB's leading de-
cisions on unit determination, the NLRB identified ten community of
interest subcriteria, all of which were treated as having nearly equal
weight. All ten subcriteria, taken together, were found to favor rejec-
tion of a proposed separate unit for truck drivers, even though some of
the subcriteria, as individually applied, would have supported a deci-
99. The possibilities of inter-classification conflicts are functions of the number of clas-
sifications and the extent of inter-classification differences, with "the number" having a
bearing on "extent" only in the sense that the larger the number of classifications, the greater
the probability that employment-related differences will impede bargaining if all classifica-
tions are placed, for example, in a single unit.
100. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3579(a) (West Supp. 1979).
101. See Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134 (1962).
102. 136 N.L.R.B. 134 (1962).
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sion that a separate unit of truck drivers was appropriate. By determin-
ing the "predominant community of interest,"' 0 3  the NLRB's
Kalamazoo decision may appear to have given some priority ranking
to community of interest subcriteria. Close analysis of the decision
reveals, however, that the NLRB merely ascertained which party had
the larger number of community of interest subcriteria in its favor.104
This is far from equivalent to assigning community of interest sub-
criteria relative weights for use in ranking them in order of their impor-
tance-the first step toward a principled application of community of
interest subcriteria.
The legislature's adoption of NLRA community of interest sub-
criteria in California labor legislation 10 5 and the PERB's adoption of
the NLRB's reasoning in disputes involving the application of interest
subcriteria are outstanding examples of the NLRA's influence on the
development of public sector labor-management relations law in Cali-
fornia. Other HEERA unit criteria, such as efficient operations, do not
derive so closely from the NLRA. Passage of time will prompt the
PERB's consideration and application of criteria, which cannot be ap-
plied fully in the resolution of the PERB's threshold unit determination
decisions.
Efficient Operations
In establishing efficiency of employer operations as a unit criterion
under HEERA, EERA, and SEERA, 10 6 the California legislature was
103. Id at 138.
104. In Kalamazoo, the NLRB identified several community of interest elements, all of
which were found to favor a denial of the severance petition and all of which were treated as
having equal importance. Some had a general application to all employees in the dispute
and were not likely to be changed by a unit configuration change, e.g., the degree of in-
terchange with other employees and the character of the work, id at 138. Others were such
that a different unit configuration, and hence possible representation by a different labor
organization, might have produced differing rather than similar employment results, e.g.,
similarity of wages and fringe benefits, id The PERB has followed the Kalamazoo case in
disputes involving both classified and certified school personnel. See, e.g., Sweetwater
Union High School Dist., I P.E.R.C. 10 (1976).
105. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3521(b)(1) (SEERA), 3545(a) (EERA), 3579(a)(1) (HEERA)
(West Supp. 1979). The reasoning of the Kalamazoo decision, see notes 102-04 & accompa-
nying text supra, may be anticipated in HEERA cases, given the similarity of the community
of interest criterion in the three statutes to the community of interest criterion established in
Kalamazoo. The apparent mechanical error made in the EERA community of interest crite-
rion of including noncommunity of interest criteria under the heading "community of inter-
est" was repeated in the SEERA, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3521(b)(1) (West Supp. 1979), and
the HEERA, id § 3579(a)(1).
106. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3521(b)(3) (SEERA), 3545(a)(EERA), 3579(a)(3)(4) (HE-
ERA) (West Supp. 1979).
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no doubt motivated by examples of inordinately fragmented units in
other public sector jurisdictions. 0 7 The efficient operations criterion,
by its terms and, unlike any other HEERA unit, is intended to benefit
employers.
From an employer's perspective, inter-union rivalry, excessive bar-
gaining, and excessive contract administration requirements are the
major problems with overly fragmented units. In addition, whipsaw
strikes have more potential for effectiveness as the number of units in-
creases. Accordingly, it is fair to conclude that such unit configurations
generally tend to disfavor employers and that the efficient operations
criterion would favor a HEERA employer's request for a single com-
prehensive unit.
On the other hand, unions are not always favored by larger unit
numbers. The number of units for which unions file petitions is gov-
erned primarily by the number of unions seeking to represent employ-
ees and the perceptions those unions have of where they might find
voting support in a representation election. Furthermore, the political
spectrum of unions representing public employees tends to be much
wider than it is in private employment because proportionately more
public sector unions have unit interests paralleling those of the em-
ployer whose employees they seek to represent. Consequently, to the
extent that a union seeking a comprehensive unit would benefit from
applying the efficient operations criterion in favor of an employer, it
would be merely an incidental beneficiary of that decision.
Although HEERA specifically addresses the problem of excessive
unit fragmentation, it does not address with similar specificity the polar
extreme of a proposed single comprehensive unit. For example, a
HEERA employer may propose a unit of all of its nonfaculty employ-
ees, with the exception of the express statutory exclusions of supervi-
sors, management, and confidential employees. The appropriateness of
such a unit depends on the number of diverse classifications and the
degree of inter-classification diversity within the proposed unit.
Both extremes illustrate why, in resolving unit determination is-
sues, community of interest criteria should be considered before the
efficient operations criterion and before considering community of in-
terest and efficient operations criteria in juxtaposition. Application of
community of interest criteria alone may justify a finding in favor of a
107. See Rock, The Appropriate Unit Question in the Public Service.- The Problem of
Proliferation, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1001 (1969). New York City at one time had 200 separate
public employee units. 1d at 1003.
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single unit or a small, but indisputably efficient, number of units. In
that event the efficient operations criterion would not have to be con-
sidered.
Same-Employee-Organization Criterion
The extent to which employees "belong to the same employee or-
ganization" 108 should be viewed as the least reliable of the HEERA
unit criteria, measured by the standard of fostering HEERA's general
objectives. HEERA's same-employee-organization criterion requires
that the PERB consider a preponderance of employee membership in
an employee organization seeking to represent that unit of employees
as a factor in favor of a particular unit. 0 9 Membership in an employee
organization that exists outside the collective bargaining context, how-
ever, may have little or nothing to do with the employee's desires
within the collective bargaining context. Certain employee organiza-
tions now competing for representation rights under public employ-
ment collective bargaining statutes easily could have attracted members
for many reasons having little to do with collective bargaining, such as
the opportunity to qualify for group life insurance. Nonetheless, the
existence of the same-employee-organization criterion in HEERA
means that it must be considered when evidence in support of its appli-
cation is presented. When considered, the criterion should be given
less weight than other HEERA unit criteria that are more in keeping
with HEERA's general statutory objective of creating a "basis for...
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of. . . orga-
nizations as . . . exclusive representative for the purpose of meeting
and conferring."' 10
Individual-Inclusion Unit Disputes
Three classes of employees are effectively excluded, either directly
or indirectly, from HEERA's coverage: managerial, confidential, and
supervisory employees."' Managerial and confidential employees are
108. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3579(a)(1) (West Supp. 1979). See text accompanying note
100 supra.
109. For example, if Union A sought to represent unit X, consisting of all nonsupervi-
sory employees, and Union B sought to represent unit Y, consisting of a small subdivision of
unit X, the fact that most employees in the overall unit belonged to Union A would be a
factor in favor of approving as an appropriate unit the overall unit sought by Union A. On
the other hand, if most of the employees in proposed unit Y belonged to Union B, that
would be a factor in favor of approving unit Y as an appropriate unit.
110. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3560(e) (West Supp. 1979).
111. HEERA § 3562(0 provides in part: " 'Employee' or 'higher education employee'
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expressly excluded from HEERA's definition of "employee."' 2 Super-
visors are not expressly excluded from that definition, but other provi-
sions of HEERA so limit the supervisors' participation in the
bargaining process that they are virtually excluded from HEERA's cov-
erage."13 As a result of these exclusions, the outcome of a representa-
tion election in any unit may hinge on the resolution of disputes
concerning the status of individuals who allegedly fall within the statu-
tory definitions of managerial, confidential, or supervisory employees.
All three classes generally are defined in HEERA on the basis of
NLRA language or NLRB precedents interpreting the NLRA.
HEERA section 3562(e) defines a confidential employee as one
"who is required to develop or present management positions with re-
means any employee of the Regents of the University of California, the Directors of Has-
tings College of the Law, or the Board of Trustees of the California State University and
Colleges, whose employment is principally within the State of California. However, manage-
rial, and confidential employees shall be excludedfrom coverage under this chapter.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3562(0 (West Supp. 1979) (emphasis added).
112. Both EERA and SEERA achieve the same exclusionary result through slightly less
direct means by providing in the definition of "employee" that managerial and confidential
employees are not "employees" within the meaning of the definitions. Id §§ 3540.1()
(EERA), 3513(c) (SEERA). The NLRA similarly removes "supervisors" from its definition
of "employee." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976). The exclusion of "managerial" and "confiden-
tial" employees from statutory coverage means that they are not protected by the various
unfair practice provisions. Without violating HEERA, a HEERA employer could discharge
or otherwise discriminate against a managerial or confidential employee because of the em-
ployee's involvement in union activity.
113. HEERA § 3580 provides: "Except as provided by this article, supervisory employ-
ees shall not have the rights, or be covered by, any provisions or definition established by
this chapter." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3580 (West Supp. 1979). However, unlike managerial
and confidential employees, supervisors do have certain limited rights under HEERA which
protect them from employer discrimination. Id § 3581.6. Supervisors have a right to par-
ticipate in union activities and to refuse to participate, as do nonsupervisors. ld § 3581.1.
However, they are prohibited from handling grievances for nonsupervisory employees, from
participating in meet and confer sessions on behalf of nonsupervisory employees, and from
voting on questions of ratification of agreements reached on behalf of nonsupervisory em-
ployees. Id § 3580.5. Supervisors are effectively cut off from the bargaining process at the
bargaining table. While the "scope of representation" for supervisors is the same as the
scope of representation for nonsupervisors, id § 3581.3, the manner in which the HEERA
employer is able to respond to a supervisory union's meet and confer request severely re-
stricts supervisors' bargaining rights. For supervisory employees, unlike nonsupervisory em-
ployees, the meet and confer definition provides: "Meet and confer means that [the
HEERA employer] shall consider as fully as the employer deems reasonable such presenta-
tions as are made by the employee organization on behalf of its supervisory members prior
to arriving at a determination of policy or course of action." Id § 3581.4 (emphasis added).
In sharp contrast to a HEERA employer's obligation to attempt in good faith to reach an
agreement with an exclusive representative of nonsupervisory employees, a HEERA em-
ployer need only listen before acting unilaterally in the case of supervisory meet and confer
requests.
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spect to meeting and conferring or whose duties normally require ac-
cess to confidential information which contributes significantly to the
development of such management positions."'"1 4 The obvious purpose
of the exclusion is to remove from bargaining units those employees
who are so involved in the employer's administration of the collective
bargaining process that their inclusion in a unit represented by a union
would raise substantial conflict of interest questions. In the clearest hy-
pothetical case, the secretary to a HEERA employer's director of labor
relations would fall within the definition of confidential employee. Be-
yond such obvious cases, the difficulties in interpreting the statutory
definition flow from an inability to discern from the definition when an
employee has the requisite degree of accessibility to confidential em-
ployer-employee relations matters. The PERB has held that mere tan-
gential contact with such matters is insufficient to bring an individual
within the definition," 5 but almost any test based on the quantum of
exposure would be of limited assistance as an aid in the application of
the confidential employee definition. A more useful standard is one
that the PERB has described in terms of the definition's objective.
In Sierra Sands Unifed School District,1 6 the PERB, interpreting
EERA's confidential employee definition, stated:
The assumption is that the employer should be allowed a small nu-
cleus of individuals who would assist the employer in the develop-
ment of the employer's positions for the purpose of employer-
employee relations. It is further assumed that this nucleus of individ-
uals would be required to keep confidential those matters that if
made public prematurely might jeopardize the employer's ability to
negotiate with employees from an equal posture.' 7
In a subsequent EERA case," 8 the PERB determined that four-
teen administrators' secretaries from two separate units were confiden-
tial employees on the basis of their involvement in "employer-
employee relations and grievances."' "19 The PERB rejected the em-
ployee organization's argument that by designating 4.5% and 12.8% of
the employees in the two units as confidential employees, the em-
ployer's grouping violated the "small nucleus" principle. The holding
114. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3562(e) (West Supp. 1979). See B.F. Goodrich Co., 115
N.L.R.B. 722 (1956), where the NLRB held that "confidential employees" are those "who
assist and act in a confidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate
management policies in the field of labor relations." Id at 724.
115. Los Rios Community College Dist., I P.E.R.C. 185, 191 (1977).
116. 1 P.E.R.C. 3 (1976).
117. Id at 4.
118. Campbell Union High School Dist., 2 P.E.R.C. 2166 (1978).
119. Id at 469-70.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31
confirms that the number of employees designated by the employer as
"confidential employees" under EERA, and similarly under HEERA,
"may not be used as a per se test in resolving the confidential-status
issue." 120
Proper application of the confidential employee definition, how-
ever, should not result in an inordinately large percentage of persons
falling within the definition because employers under California's four
major collective bargaining statutes are not primarily engaged in the
business of conducting employer-employee relations. Thus, in con-
tested cases an unusually high percentage of confidential employee des-
ignations by an HEERA employer might give rise to concern about the
propriety of the designations and cast doubt upon the employer's abil-
ity to apply accurately the "confidential" definition.' 2'
HEERA's definition of "managerial employee" provides:
"Managerial employee" means any employee having significant re-
sponsibilities for formulating or administering policies and pro-
grams. No employee or group of employees shall be deemed to be
managerial employees solely because the employee or group of em-
ployees participate in decisions with respect to courses, curriculum,
personnel and other matters of educational policy. A department
chair or head of a similar academic unit or program who performs
120. Id at 471.
121. One important question not clearly answered in the HEERA definition of "confi-
dential employee" is whether "confidential" employees are those who have access to em-
ployee grievance information developed by the employer in response to employee
grievances filed by a union. The PERB has held that "employer-employee relations," within
the meaning of the confidential-employee definition in EERA, "includes, at the least, em-
ployer-employee negotiations and the processing of employee grievances." Fremont Unified
School Dist., I P.E.R.C. 21, 24 (1976). But f B.F. Goodrich Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 722, 724
(1956) (NLRB refusal to classify as confidential employees secretaries who "assist and act in
a confidential capacity to" persons involved in labor relations negotiations and grievance
processing). The EERA definition of confidential employee might well include those who
have access to grievance procedure information, since the term "employer-employee rela-
tions" at least arguably encompasses grievance procedure matters. HEERA's definition of
confidential employee might well include those who have access to grievance procedure in-
formation, since the term "employer-employee relations" at least arguably encompasses
grievance procedure matters. HEERA's definition of confidential employee, however, dif-
fers from the EERA definition. In the HEERA definition, the words "meeting and confer-
ring" are used in lieu of EERA's "employer-employee relations." CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 3562(e) (HEERA), 3540.1 (c) (EERA) (West Supp. 1979). It is not clear whether "meeting
and conferring," as used in the HEERA definition, includes grievance procedure matters,
particularly in light of the statutory definition of "meet and confer," which does not refer to
grievance matters. Id § 3562(d). In any event, the rationale of avoiding a conflict of inter-
est, as where a bargaining unit member is only privy to an employer's bargaining strategy
information, rationally should apply to employees having access to information on griev-
ance procedure tactics. In this respect, the NLRB's decision in B.E Goodrich Co. does not
appear to be well reasoned.
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the foregoing duties primarily on behalf of the members of the aca-
demic unit or program shall not be deemed a managerial employee
solely because of such duties.'
22
The first sentence in the definition parallels EERA's definition of
"management employee,"' 123 which in turn was derived from decisions
interpreting the NLRA. 124 Basic differences between the administra-
tive structure of HEERA's higher education employers and the public
schools covered by EERA, however, probably will limit the usefulness
of EERA "management employee" decisions as applied in HEERA
cases.' 25 Furthermore, EERA's "management employee" definition
has a sharper focus than the HEERA "managerial employee" defini-
tion. The EERA definition uses the word "district" in describing the
"policies and programs" over which an individual must have signifi-
cant policy-formulation or administrative responsibilities to be classi-
fied as a management employee. 26 HEERA's definition, however,
does not make clear the level-departmental, campus, or statewide-at
which one must have "significant responsibilities for formulating or ad-
ministering policies and programs."'
' 27
122. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3562(1) (West Supp. 1979).
123. " 'Management employee' means any employee in a position having significant re-
sponsibilities for formulating district policies or administering district programs. Manage-
ment positions shall be designated by the public school employer subject to review by the
Educational Employment Relations Board." Id § 3540.1(g).
124. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974), which traces the history of
the NLRB's treatment of the management employee issue and approves the definition of
"managerial employee" as fashioned by the NLRB. Quoting from Ford Motor Co., 66
N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946), the Court said managerial employees are those "who are in a
position to formulate, determine and effectuate management policies." 416 U.S. at 276. The
NLRA itself contains no definition of management employee.
125. Individual campuses within the California university and college system have a
degree of autonomy that does not exist in individual schools within a public school district.
126. See note 123 supra.
127. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3562(1) (West Supp. 1979). See text accompanying note 122
supra. Query, for example, whether the chancellors of the nine University of California
campuses, the presidents of the California State Universities and Colleges, and the dean of
the law school at the University of California, Los Angeles, are not "managerial employees"
within the meaning of HEERA § 3562(1), on the ground that the policies they administer
and formulate are not system-wide. The PERB has held that school principals under EERA
are not management employees within the meaning of the EERA definition. San Francisco
Unified School Dist., 1 P.E.R.C. 380 (1977). Hastings College of the Law is governed by a
board of directors that is independent of the Board of Regents of the University of Califor-
nia and the Board of Trustees of the California State University and Colleges. Accordingly,
the hierarchical level at which managerial duties might bring an individual within the "man-
agerial employee" definition should be easily identifiable at Hastings.
EERA § 3540.1(g), CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3540.1(g) (West Supp. 1979), defines "manage-
ment employee." See note 123 supra. PERB decisions interpreting the "management em-
ployee" definition in the EERA include: Paramount Unified School Dist., 1 P.E.R.C. 437
(1977) (counselors are not "management employees"); Los Rios Community College Dist., 1
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The second sentence of the HEERA "managerial employee" defi-
nition was enacted because of concern that all HEERA faculty mem-
bers might be deemed "managerial employees" and hence excluded
from HEERA's coverage on the ground that faculty members "formu-
late and administer" policies as members of faculty committees and
policymaking groups, and as members of academic senates and aca-
demic senate committees. 128 The sentence clearly establishes, however,
that the legislature did not intend to exclude all faculty members from
HEERA's coverage. The third and last sentence in the "managerial
employee" definition 29 appears to do no more than clarify that the
P.E.R.C. 185 (1977) (community college financial aid coordinators are not "management
employees"); Oakland Unified School Dist., 1 P.E.R.C. 137 (1977) (school psychologists are
not "management employees"); Lompoc Unified School Dist., 1 P.E.R.C. 80 (1977) (subject
coordinators are not "managerial employees" since their alleged policy making functions are
subject to approval by higher authority in the district). Under EERA § 3540.1(g), a manage-
ment employee is an employee "having significant responsibilities for formulating district
policies or administering district programs." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3540.1(g) (West Supp.
1979) (emphasis added). However, the PERB interpreted "or" to mean "and" in concurring
opinions in Lompoc Unified School Dist., I P.E.R.C. 80, 86 (1977). The conjunctive stan-
dard was adopted by the Board in Los Rios Community College Dist., I P.E.R.C. 185, 190
(1977), and has never been repudiated by the PERB. The PERB construction of the statu-
tory language, of course, limits the number of individuals who will be found to be manage-
ment employees under EERA. NLRB decisions, in contrast, use a disjunctive standard.
See, e.g., Flintkote Co., 217 N.L.R.B. 497, 499 (1975) ("project engineers do not formulate
or effectuate management policies, since their recommendations must be approved by man-
agement officials, and they do not have discretion in their job performance independent of
their Employer's established policy." (emphasis added)).
Carried to its logical extreme, the PERB's conversion of the disjunctive to the conjunc-
tive could mean that no person employed by a school district is a managerial employee. It
could be argued, for example, that the superintendent of a school district is not a "manage-
rial employee" because, although the superintendent has significant responsibilities for ad-
ministering district programs, he or she does not have significant responsibilities for
formulating district policies, since the latter is an exclusive function of the school board.
128. See text accompanying note 122 supra. Even in the absence of the second sentence
in HEERA's "managerial employee" definition, a decision interpreting "managerial em-
ployee" to include all faculty members of a HEERA employer nevertheless would be incon-
sistent with the overall objectives of HEERA. HEERA, taken as a whole, authorizes
collective bargaining for all university employees, including faculty members, except those
who are confidential or managerial employees, as defined in the first sentence of the defini-
tion, or supervisors. It is less certain that Congress intended to provide NLRA coverage for
faculty members in private universities and colleges. A decision involving the NLRB's exer-
cise of jurisdiction over private universities and colleges to exclude university faculty from
coverage of the NLRA is now pending review in the United States Supreme Court. See
NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 440 U.S. 906 (1979). See
generally Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education: The Failure of Policy Making Through
Adjudication, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 63, 118-31 (1973). Outside of the Second Circuit, the
NLRB does not follow the Yeshiva decision. See, e.g., Stephens College, 100 L.R.R.M. 1268
(1979).
129. See text accompanying note 122 supra.
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formulation or administration of policies and programs must be on be-
half of the employer to bring an individual within the definition. Even
in the absence of that sentence, elementary agency concepts would em-
brace the requirement that an individual's managerial duties be on be-
half of the employer.
HEERA also defines a supervisory employee with three sentences,
the first of which defines a supervisory employee as
any individual, regardless of the job description or title, having au-
thority, in the interest of the employer to hire, transfer, suspend, lay
off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward or discipline other em-
ployees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances,
or effectively to recommend such action if. .. the exercise of such
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires
the use of independent judgment.'
30
This sentence is virtually identical to the NLRA's complete definition
of "supervisor,"'' 3 ' which EERA adopted without material change.
32
The second sentence of the HEERA supervisory employee definition
has no NLRA counterpart. It provides that a faculty or academic em-
ployee who chairs departments or heads similar academic units or pro-
grams, "or other employee who performs the foregoing duties primarily
• ..on behalf of the members of the academic department, unit or
program, shall not be deemed a supervisory employee solely because of
such duties."' 33 This sentence serves the important function of expli-
130. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3580.3 (West Supp. 1979).
131. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976) provides: "The term 'supervisor' means any individual
having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct
them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection
with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature,
but requires the use of independent judgment."
132. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3540.1(m) (West Supp. 1979). The EERA definition of
"supervisory employee," like the HEERA definition, makes it clear that a "job description"
and a job "title" are of little consequence in determining whether an individual is a "super-
visor." It is what the individual actually does that is of consequence. This always has been
implicit in the NLRA definition. See note 131 & accompanying text supra.
133. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3580.3 (West Supp. 1979). This section also provides, how-
ever, that with respect to the University of California and Hastings College of the Law
"there shall be a rebuttable presumption that such an individual appointed by the employer
to an indefinite term shall be deemed to be a supervisor." Id This phrase could be read to
mean that any department chairperson or similar individual who has tenure is a supervisor.
But if the legislature had intended "appointed to an indefinite term" to mean "tenure," it
could have used that term. Further, such a broad reading of the "appointed to an indefinite
term" phrase would be inconsistent with the section's earlier language which limits the cir-
cumstances under which department chairpersons and similar individuals would be found to
be supervisors under HEERA. This phrase most probably means that department chairper-
sons and similar individuals who are appointed to an indefinite term as administrators are to
be deemed supervisors without regard to whether they perform such duties primarily "on
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cating that faculty members are not supervisors because of their shared
governance authority-the same position adopted by the NLRB in its
decisions.
134
The third sentence in the definition provides: "Employees whose
duties are substantially similar to those of their subordinates shall not
be considered to be supervisory employees."' 35 This sentence also has
no counterpart in the express terms of the NLRA definition, but was
adopted from decisions of the NLRB interpreting the NLRA defini-
tion. 36 Following NLRB precedents interpreting the NLRA's "super-
visor" definition, the PERB, in applying EERA's supervisory employee
definition, consistently has held that the EERA definition is written in
the disjunctive: an individual who exercises any one of the functions
enumerated in the definition comes within the definition. 37 But early
decisions of the PERB tended to ignore the statute's proviso that the
supervisory employee definition does not apply if the authority exer-
cised by an individual is of a "merely routine or clerical nature" and
does not "require the use of independent judgment."'138 Thus, while
the PERB purported to rely upon NLRB decisions interpreting the
NLRA's definition of supervisor, it did not follow the NLRB's well-
known distinction between the routine and incidental supervisory func-
tions of a leadman and the independent supervisory authority contem-
plated by the NLRA's "supervisor" definition. 39
behalf of the members of the academic unit." Why this section applies to the University of
California and the Hastings College of the Law, but not to the California State University
and College system, is unclear.
134. NLRB v. Southern Bleachery & Printworks, Inc., 257 F.2d 235, 239 (4th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 911 (1959); Iroquois Tel. Corp., 169 N.L.R.B. 344, 345 n.6 (1968);
Heck's, Inc., 166 N.L.R.B. 674, 674 n.l (1967); Ross Porta-Plant, Inc., 166 N.L.R.B. 494, 497
(1967).
135. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3580.3 (West Supp. 1979).
136. Meat & Provision Drivers Union Local 626,224 N.L.R.B. 186, 186 (1976); Laborers
& Hodcarriers Local No. 341, 223 N.L.R.B. 917, 919 (1976).
137. See, e.g., Carlsbad Unified School Dist., I P.E.R.C. 590, 590, 591 n.3 (1977); San
Diego Unified School Dist., I P.E.R.C. 33, 35, 38 n.12 (1977); Sweetwater Union High
School Dist., I P.E.R.C. 10, 13, 18 n.6 (1976). Each of these cases expressly follows the
NLRA case, Ohio Power & Light Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 385 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 388
U.S. 899 (1979).
138. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3540.1(m) (West Supp. 1979). See note 139 infra.
139. See note 131 supra See, e.g., NLRB v. Swift & Co., 240 F.2d 65, 66-67, (9th Cir.
1957) (holding that plant clerks who told employees where to place certain products were
not supervisors, since those activities were of "a merely routine or clerical nature"). Accord,
Meat and Provision Drivers Local 626, 224 N.L.R.B. 186 (1976); Laborers and Hod Carriers
Local 341, 223 N.L.R.B. 917 (1976); NLRB v. Dunkirk Motor Inn, Inc., 524 F.2d 663 (2d
Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Monroe Tube Co., 545 F.2d 1320 (2d Cir. 1976). PERB decisions
under EERA which follow the rationale of Sweetwater Union High School Dist., I P.E.R.C.
10 (1976), on the issue of determining the scope of the definition of supervisory employee
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In Sweetwater Union High School District,140 the PERB held that
head custodians employed by a public school were supervisors within
the meaning of the EERA definition.' 4 ' Even though these employees
worked alone during most of their shift, they spent virtually all of their
time doing the same kind of maintenance and repair work as those they
purportedly supervised, and the effective supervisory authority was
held by the school principals. The decision relied in part on purported
differences between the NLRA and EERA. The PERB noted that
while EERA allows supervisors to be represented in a negotiating unit
separate from units of employees they supervise, the NLRA permits no
such supervisory units. Based on this distinction, the PERB implicitly
reasoned that EERA permits more individuals to be deemed supervi-
sors because of the less harmful consequences of EERA supervisory
status. 142 The notion that supervisors eventually would be represented
in supervisory units has never become a reality; of 1,908 representation
units formed under EERA over a period of three years, only twenty-
five are supervisory units. 143 Further, even if the premise of equal rep-
resentation opportunity for supervisory units were valid, it seems evi-
dent that the attendant conclusion in favor of supervisory status for
head custodians improperly confused supervisory status conse-
include: Sacramento City Unified School Dist., 1 P.E.R.C. 419 (1977) (skilled crafts fore-
men, school plant managers, and food services managers are supervisors); San Diego Uni-
fied School Dist., 1 P.E.R.C. 33 (1977) (building services supervisors and head gardeners are
supervisors). But see San Rafael City Schools, 1 P.E.R.C. 433 (1977) (maintenance and
operations field supervisor is not supervisor); New Haven Unified School Dist., I P.E.R.C.
121 (1977) (high school department heads are not supervisors); Foothill-De Anza Commu-
nity College Dist., I P.E.R.C. 64 (1977) (custodial foremen are not supervisors). In New
Haven Unified School District, the PERB for the first time discussed the leadman/supervisor
distinction. The PERB stated: "[lit is clear that department heads are primarily classroom
teachers, and in their assignment as department heads function only as an experienced em-
ployee giving assistance to those less experienced or as an administrative coordinator within
a department." 1 P.E.R.C. at 123. The PERB's decision in Oakland Unified School Dist., 2
P.E.R.C. 2089, at 198 (1978), also relies upon the absence of the use of independent judg-
ment in finding that "supervising" custodians were not supervisors within the meaning of
the EERA definition of "supervisory employees." See note 132 supra.
140. 1 P.E.R.C. 10 (1976).
141. CAL. Gov'r CODE § 3540.1(m) (West Supp. 1979).
142. 1 P.E.R.C. at 13-14.
143. Telephone Interview with Charles M. Cole, Executive Director, PERB (Sept. 19,
1979). EERA § 3545(b)(2) provides in part: "A negotiating unit of supervisory employees
. . . shall not be represented by the same employee organization as employees whom the
supervisory employees supervise." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3545(b)(2) (West Supp. 1979). The
effect of this section of EERA is to force many unions to elect whether to represent a super-
visory unit or a nonsupervisory unit. Logically, representation of the larger unit, probably
the nonsupervisory unit, would be elected.
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quences' 44 and the distinct threshold question of which employees fall
within the EERA supervisory definition.
145
The last sentence in the HEERA "supervisory employee" defini-
tion, which provides that "[e]mployees whose duties are substantially
similar to those of their subordinates shall not be considered to be su-
pervisory employees,"' 146 undoubtedly was enacted in response to the
PERB decisions discussed above which read the "supervisory em-
ployee" definition as though the independent judgment proviso did not
exist. Consideration of the explicit legislative command in the third
sentence of HEERA's supervisory definition may be anticipated in ap-
propriate HEERA cases involving academic 147 and nonacademic em-
ployees.
Unfair Practices
Consistent with the NLRA, 148 EERA, 149 and SEERA, 150 HEERA
contains definitions of unfair employer and union practices.' 5'
HEERA section 3565 152 is the core of the Act's unfair practice sections,
providing:
Higher education employees shall have the right to form, join and
participate in the activities of employee organizations of their own
choosing for the purpose of representation on all matters of em-
ployer-employee relations and for the purpose of meeting and con-
ferring. Higher education employees shall also have the right to
144. See notes 111-13 & accompanying text supra.
145. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3540.1(m) (West Supp. 1979).
146. Id
147. An instructive NLRB decision treating a wide range of classifications of academic
employees whose supervisory, as well as confidential and managerial, statuses were in dis-
pute, is New York Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. 1148 (1975). The NLRB held department chairmen
to be supervisors because they effectively recommended hiring, termination, salary increases,
and promotion of full-time faculty and because they evaluated faculty performance and
assigned faculty class schedules. On similar reasoning, program directors, the vice director
of a language institute, the director of computer and mathematical sciences, and others were
held to be supervisors. Academic employees with academic and administrative duties were
held to be supervisors if 50% or more of their time was spent supervising non-unit employ-
ees. Principal investigators were among those found not to be supervisors within the mean-
ing of NLRA § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976). The New York University decision must
be read with caution, as many of the employee classifications discussed are those having
similar titles but different job functions at different colleges and universities. See, e.g.,
Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247 (1975), where principal investigators were excluded
from the unit as supervisors.
148. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a), (b) (1976).
149. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3543.5, 3543.6 (West Supp. 1979).
150. See id. §§ 3519, 3519.5.
151. Id §§ 3571, 3571.1.
152. Id § 3565.
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refuse to join employee organizations or to participate in the activi-
ties of these organizations subject to the organizational security pro-
vision permissible under this chapter.'
53
Section 3565 thus establishes the basic right to organize for collective
bargaining purposes and to engage in collective bargaining through a
selected bargaining representative. In other sections HEERA makes it
an unfair practice for a HEERA employer to interfere with this and
other rights described in the Act 154 and for a union to interfere with an
employee's right to refuse to participate in an employee organiza-
tion. 155 These unfair employer practices may be divided into two main
categories: (1) those that unlawfully interfere with the rights of em-
ployees to organize for collective bargaining purposes; 156 and (2) those
that unlawfully interfere with the bargaining process itself.
15 7
The second category may well be the most significant for employ-
ees because employer infringements on the right to organize for collec-
tive bargaining are far less frequent in the public sector than they are in
the private sector. 158 This is because public employers generally do not
resist union efforts at organization until after representation rights have
been gained by a union. Thus, it may be anticipated that under
HEERA, as has been the case under EERA, relatively few charges of
interference with the right to organize will be filed. 159 Instead, charges
of employer unfair practices under HEERA will consist primarily of
153. Id
154. Id § 3571(a), (b). In making it an unfair practice to interfere with or deny rights
guaranteed by HEERA, the Act, by reference and adoption, brings within its unfair practice
provisions some statutory rights not found in the unfair practice sections themselves. For
example, the released time requirements of HEERA, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3569 (West Supp.
1979), if not met by an employer, would constitute an unfair practice under CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 357 1(b) (West Supp. 1979), which makes it an unfair practice to "[d]eny to employee
organizations rights guaranteed to them by this chapter."
155. Id §§ 3565, 3571.1(b).
156. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 357 1(a) (West Supp. 1979) provides: "It shall be unlawful for
the higher education employer to. . . impose or threaten to impose reprisals on employees,
to discriminate or threaten to discriminate against employees, or otherwise to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees because of their exercise of rights guaranteed to them by this
chapter." CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3571.1(a), (b) (West Supp. 1979) imposes comparable restric-
tions upon unions.
157. Id § 3571(c).
158. Approximately 70% of the charges filed with the NLRB allege some form of inter-
ference with the right to engage in union activity. 40 NLRB ANN. REP. 215 (1975). In
contrast, during the first two years of its existence, the PERB (then Educational Employment
Relations Board) decided no case involving a charge of interference with the right to organ-
ize. Of the 344 representation elections conducted during that period, a majority vote for
"no representation" occurred in only 7 elections, and the results of only 7 elections were
challenged by objections. See [1977] EERA ANN. REP. 59-90.
159. See note 158 supra.
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allegations of unlawful bargaining practices and closely related mat-
ters.
Unfair Meet-and-Confer Practices
One of HEERA's most important unfair practices sections pro-
vides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for the higher education employer to
.. . [riefuse or fail to engage in meeting and conferring with an exclu-
sive representative.' 160 This unfair practice provision raises two sepa-
rate but related questions, neither of which is apparent on the face of
the provision: (1) what are the subjects which a HEERA employer be-
comes obligated to bargain over with an exclusive representative upon
demand; and (2) once those subjects are identified, what is the extent to
which an employer becomes obligated to consider and respond to an
exclusive representative's demands as they relate to valid subjects of
bargaining? In the lexicon of HEERA the first question is answered
under the rubric of "subjects of bargaining"; known in NLRA parlance
as subjects within the scope of representation. Similarly, in relation to
the second issue, the obligation to bargain under the NLRA is known
as the obligation to engage in "meeting and conferring" under
HEERA. 161
The extent of the "meet and confer" obligation under HEERA's
definition is virtually identical to the NLRA definition of the extent of
the bargaining obligation.1 62 The words "meet and confer," as used in
HEERA, may cause initial confusion because in other California legis-
lation the same words have meant something less than collective bar-
gaining in the NLRA sense. 163 The meaning ascribed to "meet and
160. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3571(c) (West Supp. 1979). Unions are similarly obligated to
meet and confer with the employer. d § 357 1.1(c). While silent on the subject, this section
obviously presupposes that a union has exclusive representative status.
161. Id § 3562(d). See text accompanying note 164 infra.
162. NLRA § 8(d) provides: "For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agree-
ment reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party
to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession .... " 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1976).
163. See San Juan Teachers Ass'n v. San Juan Unified School Dist., 44 Cal. App. 3d
232, 118 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1974), where the court of appeal described the extent of the "meet
and confer" obligation under the Winton Act, CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 13080-13088 (West
Supp. 1968-69) (repealed July 1, 1976), as follows: "'[T]here is no statutory requirement
that the employer "negotiate" in the sense of striving to reach a contract, bargain or agree-
ment. Rather, the statutory obligation of the employer is expressed in the words "meet and
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confer" in other California statutory enactments, however, is irrelevant
in the face of a statutory definition under HEERA that does not follow
the meaning found in earlier California statutes and cases, but rather
follows the NLRA's definition of the term "bargain collectively."
HEERA section 3562(d) defines "meet and confer" as the mutual obli-
gation of an employer and an exclusive representative "to meet at rea-
sonable times and to confer in good faith with respect to matters within
the scope of representation and to endeavor to reach agreement on
matters within the scope of representation.'164 This definition differs
drastically from an obligation merely to "consider" a union's proposal
before acting, which was all a higher education employer was obligated
to do before HEERA became effective.1 65 The difference between a
duty to "consider" and the duty to "meet and confer," as defined in
HEERA section 3562(d), 166 can be likened to the difference between
listening with no obligation to attempt to agree or make a counterpro-
posal and listening with an obligation to attempt in good faith to reach
an agreement or make a counterproposal.
More difficult questions might arise under the HEERA "meet and
confer" definition, spawning complex litigation before the PERB. The
obligation to meet and confer under HEERA extends only to matters
"within the scope of representation,"'' 67 a phrase which HEERA de-
fines in general terms1 68 that are followed by several specific exceptions
to the general definition.169 The general definition, which is an almost
confer .... 44 Cal. App. 3d at 252, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 673 (quoting Torrance Educ. Ass'n v.
Board of Educ., 21 Cal. App. 3d 589, 593, 98 Cal. Rptr. 639, 642 (1971)). Ironically, the
words "meet" and "confer" appear in the NLRA's definition of the term "bargain collec-
tively." See note 162 supra.
164. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3562(d) (West Supp. 1979).
165. See note 163 supra.
166. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3562(d) (West Supp. 1979).
167. Id
168. Id. § 3562(q)-(r).
169. Id. Section 3562(q), relating to University of California employees, and § 3562(r),
relating to California State University and Colleges, provide exemptions which differ. Id
The Act, however, in § 3582, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3582 (West Supp. 1979), clearly speci-
fies that the issue of organizational security is within the Act's scope of representation.
When a union becomes the exclusive representative of an employee unit, it logically seeks to
have all members of the unit join the union, arguing that such an arrangement is necessary
to the union's organizational effectiveness and security. Under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, the employer and union can agree to a contractual provision which mandates that
all employees join the union after they have been on the job for thirty days. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1976). EERA adopts an organizational security scheme somewhat similar to
that under the NLRA. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3540.1(i)(2), 3546 (West Supp. 1979) (by ar-
rangement may be made mandatory). HEERA, however, departs radically from the NLRA
model. Under HEERA, joining an employee organization is not a requirement for contin-
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exact counterpart of NLRA section 8(d),' 70 provides: "[S]cope of rep-
resentation means, and is limited to, wages, hours of employment, and
other terms and conditions of employment."' 7' Some of the exceptions
that follow, such as those relating to promotion and tenure, 72 specifi-
cally remove several issues from the scope or representation that other-
wise would be within the definition.1 73 Other exceptions, such as the
exception related to collecting student fees and establishing admission
requirements, 74 functions unique to universities and colleges, clearly
are beyond the "terms and conditions of employment" and hence
would not be within the scope of representation in any event.
Voluntary Subjects of Bargaining
Under NLRA case law, any matter not within the scope of bar-
ued employment. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3583 (West Supp. 1979). It is completely up to the
individual employee whether to join the employee organization or not. However, an em-
ployer and employee organization may agree, if they desire, to a contractual provision re-
quiring the employer to deduct automatically from the wages of employees who do decide to
join the employee organization initiation fees, dues, and the like, charged by the given or-
ganization, and to forward these monies directly to the employee organization. Id
The HEERA organizational security scheme gives employees the freedom to decide
whether or not to join an employee organization, as opposed to requiring employees to join
as a condition of employment. This scheme, however, has a sharp element of inequity in
that those who do not join the organization will benefit from the work of the organization
without contributing to it. It may be that the costs in terms of reduced employee freedom of
choice are more than offset by the benefits in terms of more effective representation which
are gained when unit employees are required to join the employee organization which repre-
sents them. In any event, the matter is worthy of further consideration and study by the
legislature.
170. The NLRA provides that the duty to bargain collectively requires the parties to
"meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other
terms and conditions of employment. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
171. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3562(q)-(r) (West Supp. 1979).
172. Id § 3562(q) (relating to University of California). C id § 3562(r)(4) (exempting
"criteria and standards to be used for the appointment, promotion, evaluation, and tenure of
academic employees" of the California State University and Colleges).
173. See NLRB v. Houston Chapter Associated Gen. Contractors of America, Inc., 349
F.2d 449, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1966) (tenure of employment is
a mandatory subject of bargaining); E.W. Scripps Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 227, 228 (1951) (merit
increases are a mandatory subject of bargaining despite the difficulty involved in setting
evaluative standards).
174. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3562(q)(2)-(3) (University of California), (r)(2)-(3) (California
State University and Colleges) (West Supp. 1979). There is no "scope of representation"
definition for Hastings College of the Law. A fair interpretation of the Act would include
Hastings within the "scope of representation" definition for the University of California.
CAL. Govr CODE § 3562(q)(1) (West Supp. 1979) refers to "directors," an apparent refer-
ence to the Board of Directors of Hastings College of the Law. Also, as HEERA's preamble
notes, Hastings College of the Law is "an affiliate of the University of California." Id
§ 3560(c).
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gaining is either a permissive subject of bargaining, which means that
an employer voluntarily may bargain over the subject upon request
even though not required to do so, or an illegal subject of bargaining,
over which no bargaining may take place.175 HEERA, like EERA and
SEERA, has a provision that fails to clarify whether the Act contains a
similar mandatory-permissive-illegal trichotomy. Specifically, under
HEERA it is not entirely clear whether a union's proposed subject of
bargaining which is not within the scope of representation and not ille-
gal may be the subject of voluntary bargaining by the employer.
The pertinent HEERA section on voluntary bargaining provides:
All matters not within the scope of representation are reserved to the
employer and may not be subject to meeting and conferring, pro-
vided that nothing herein may be construed to limit the right of the
employer to consult with any employees or employee organization
on any matter outside the scope of representation.
17 6
This section appears to depart from private sector case law recognition
of permissive subjects of bargaining. As used in HEERA, the words
"may not" might well be construed to mean that subjects not within the
scope of representation "shall not" be subject to meeting and confer-
ring; further, the remainder of the section, consistent with such an in-
terpretation, might well be construed to mean that an employer shall
do no more than consult with the exclusive representative. Under that
reading, the University of California, for example, could not bargain
and enter into an agreement with a union on the subject of arbitration
procedures for promotion and tenure of faculty members, even if the
University thought that such action might enhance good employer-em-
ployee relations. 177 Any ambiguity in the provision, however, might be
resolved in favor of permitting a HEERA employer voluntarily to in-
clude in a bargaining agreement a matter not within the scope of repre-
sentation, provided that such agreement is not illegal. The words "may
not be subject to meeting and conferring" could be read as permissive
and not mandatory language. Arguably, the legislature could have
used the mandatory "shall" had it intended to preclude an employer
from voluntarily reaching an agreement with a union on a legal subject
that is not within the scope of representation. Further, it is difficult to
perceive what harm might result to a HEERA employer or the public
under an interpretation that permits an employer voluntarily to bargain
175. NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
176. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3562(q) (West Supp. 1979).
177. A grievance-arbitration procedure for promotion and tenure of faculty members is
expressly removed from the "scope of representation." Id § 3562(q)(4) (University of Cali-
fornia), (r)(4) (California State University and Colleges).
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over matters not within the "scope of representation." Not only is a
HEERA employer free to refuse to bargain over matters not within the
scope of representation, but a union's insistence that an employer nego-
tiate over a matter that is not within the scope of representation is itself
an unlawful refusal to negotiate under settled case law.178 Accordingly,
an employer may resist bargaining over such matters, thus preserving
the voluntary character of any bargaining over matters outside the
scope of representation.
Surface Bargaining
Apart from a flat refusal to meet and confer on the ground that a
proposed subject of bargaining is outside the scope of representation,
other classes of disputes could arise under HEERA's meet and confer
section. An unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA is
committed when an employer goes through the motions of bargaining
without intending to reach an agreement 79 or when an employer uni-
laterally changes conditions of employment that are within the scope of
negotiations.18 0 In the former instance, potential difficulties of proof
are obvious. To establish a violation the union must prove a state of
mind and, in the absence of an admission of an intention not to reach
an agreement, the union must offer objective proof to establish the sub-
jective element of bad faith.
In an important decision interpreting EERA, the PERB followed
federal case law in looking "to the entire course of negotiations to de-
termine whether the employer. . . negotiated with the requisite subjec-
tive intention of reaching an agreement."'' Presumably, the PERB
also will follow federal precedents establishing that unacceptable pro-
posals must be met with counter-proposals, 8 2 that an employer must
make "every reasonable effort to reach an agreement,"' 8 3 that the obli-
gation to bargain does not "encourage a party to engage in fruitless
marathon discussions at the expense of frank statement and support of
his position,"' 8 4 and that unilateral changes in working conditions,
short of impasse and without notice to a union, constitute unlawful re-
178. See Allied Chemical and Alkali Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404
U.S. 157 (1971).
179. See generally NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-03 (1952).
180. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). Katz was relied on by the PERB in Pajaro
Valley Unified School Dist., 2 P.E.R.C. 2107 (1978).
181. Pajaro Unified School Dist., 2 P.E.R.C. 2107, at 253 (1978).
182. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1952).
183. Id
184. Id at 404.
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HEERA's released time provision attempts to reconcile the inter-
ests of the employer in maintaining employees on the job and the inter-
ests of the union in having employees from the represented unit on the
union's negotiating team. Under a deliberately vague standard of rea-
sonableness, a number of employees are entitled to paid time off to
serve for reasonable periods of time as members of their union's negoti-
ating team:
A reasonable number of representatives of an exclusive representa-
tive shall have the right to receive reasonable periods of released or
reassigned time without loss of compensation when engaged in meet-
ing and conferring and for the processing of grievances prior to the
adoption of the initial memorandum of understanding. When a
memorandum of understanding is in effect, released or reassigned
time shall be in accordance with the memorandum.
86
The "released time" provision in HEERA is roughly analogous to that
found in EERA, although the language of the two provisions differs in
certain significant ways.' 87 Further, both the EERA and the HEERA
released time provisions depart considerably from the private sector
model, which contains no statutory released time requirement, but al-
lows parties to agree to include reasonable released time clauses in col-
lective bargaining agreements.
88
HEERA's released time provision has two components. First,
before any memorandum of understanding has been adopted, the em-
ployer is required to afford employee organization representatives "rea-
185. Id. at 399, 409. See PERB's decision in Muroc Unified School Dist., 3 P.E.R.C.
10,004 (1978) (no surface bargaining violation).
186. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3569 (West Supp. 1979).
187. The EERA states: "A reasonable number of representatives of an exclusive repre-
sentative shall have the right to receive reasonable periods of released time without loss of
compensation when meeting and negotiating and for the processing of grievances." Id
§ 3543.1(c).
188. Payment of employee organization representatives for time spent in the processing
of grievances has long been a common industrial practice in the private sector. See Basic
Patterns in Labor Arbitration Agreements, 34 Lab. Arb. Disp. Settl. 931, 935 (1960) (estimat-
ing, in 1960, that over half of the private collective bargaining contracts in the nation con-
tained provisions providing pay for time spent by employees processing grievances). Over
time, these provisions were broadened to include payment for time spent negotiating. See,
e.g., American Sterilizer Co., 47 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 203 (1966) (Dworkin, Arb.). Such
payments, if reasonable, have been held not to constitute a violation of § 8(a)(2) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1976). See Employees' Independent Union v. Wyman-
Gordon Co., 314 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Atlantic Richfield Co., [1976-1977] NLRB
Dec. (CCH) 20,092 (1977) (Advice Memo).
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sonable" released time for purposes of meeting and conferring with the
employer; refusal by the employer to provide "reasonable" released
time is an unfair practice under section 3571(b) of HEERA.189 In de-
termining what constitutes "reasonable" released time for purposes of
initial meet and confer sessions, parties have the guidance of PERB
decisions construing what in this respect is virtually identical language
in EERA.190
In Magnolia School District,19' a school district had restricted re-
leased time to the one-half hour period between 3:00 p.m. and 3:30
p.m., which was noninstructional teacher time. The PERB held that
per se rules barring release from instructional periods are inappropriate
and that, at least in some cases, teacher negotiators must be given re-
leased time during the normal teaching day. The Board also implicitly
held that the reasonable released time provision applies to meeting and
conferring during mediation and other impasse procedures and noted
that employers must be willing to assume a flexible posture with respect
to released time procedures.192
In Burbank Unfled School District,93 however, the PERB outlined
the limits of the EERA released time provision. PERB found that the
legislature's intent was to "ensure effective representation for employ-
ees in negotiations and grievance processing. . .[by lessening] the bur-
den on employee representatives whose effectiveness may otherwise be
limited by time restraints." 194 The PERB held that such "effective rep-
resentation" was not meaningfully impaired by the school district's re-
fusal to grant employee organization negotiators recuperative released
time the morning after a late-night negotiating session.
The second component of the HEERA released time provision,
however, does not have an EERA counterpart. The basic released time
right under HEERA section 3569 applies "prior to the adoption of the
initial memorandum of understanding."'195 Once a memorandum of
understanding is in effect, section 3569 requires that "released or reas-
signed time shall be in accordance with the memorandum."'' 96 If, in a
memorandum of understanding, the parties agree on a released time
clause, or if they agree that the employee representatives of an em-
189. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3571(b) (West Supp. 1979).
190. Id § 3543.1(c).
191. 1 P.E.R.C. 258 (1977).
192. Id at 259.
193. 2 P.E.R.C. 1 2173 (1978).
194. Id at 473.
195. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3569 (West Supp. 1979).
196. Id
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ployee organization will forego their released time rights, the memo-
randum of understanding provision should govern. A problem might
arise, however, if the memorandum were silent on the released time
issue. A literal reading of the statutory language might support an ar-
gument that silence operates as an implicit waiver of the released time
right. Such a reading places the burden on the employee organization
to raise the released time issue during negotiations and successfully ne-
gotiate contract language on the subject. This reading poses two
problems. First, implied waivers of statutory rights are generally
avoided. 197 Second, that reading in some instances would require a
union to raise the subject of released time as a bargaining proposal, not
because the union wanted a released time clause that was more
favorable than the statutory released time provision, but solely to avoid
an implicit waiver of a statutory right.
Public Notice
Certain tensions are inherent in any bargaining process, but there
are some sources of tension that are unique in the context of public
sector collective bargaining. One source of tension is the competing
demands of those who view collective bargaining in public employ-
ment as part of the open political process and those who view labor
negotiations as benefitting most from the privacy of the bargaining ta-
ble. Most states yield to the latter view and make no provision for bar-
gaining in public. A small number of states, on the other hand, require
so-called "bargaining in the sunshine."' 198 In each of its three public
employment collective bargaining statutes-EERA, 199 SEERA, °2 0 and
HEERA20 1 -California has taken a stance that is a compromise be-
tween these two polar positions. Within HEERA, sections 3595,202 the
Act's public notice provision, and 3596,203 concerning open meeting ex-
emptions, effect this compromise.
Section 3596, although not part of HEERA's article on public no-
tice, has a direct impact on the public visibility of collective bargaining
under HEERA. Section 3596 specifically exempts higher education
employers and employee organizations from the general "open meet-
197. Cf Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974) (no prospective
waiver of employee rights under Title VII).
198. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.69(2) (West Supp. 1979) (public access required
except when director of mediation services specifies otherwise).
199. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3547 (West Supp. 1979).
200. Id § 3523.
201. Id § 3595.
202. Id
203. Id § 3596.
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ing" requirements that govern legislative bodies at the state and local
level. 2 4 The public thus has no right to view or take an active role in
negotiations. However, HEERA's article on public notice, section
3595, has provisions that ensure that interested members of the public
are apprised of initial subjects offered for negotiation by either the
HEERA employer or its employees' exclusive representatives. Section
3595(a) provides that "[a]ll initial proposals of exclusive representatives
and of higher education employers, which relate to matters within the
scope of representation, shall be presented at a public meeting of the
higher education employer and thereafter shall be public records.
20 5
Section 3595 further provides: (1) that members of the public shall
have an opportunity to express their views regarding the proposals
before negotiations begin; 20 6 (2) that subsequently the higher education
employer must adopt its initial proposal, including any changes
deemed appropriate based on public comments, at a public meeting;
20 7
and (3) that "[n]ew subjects of meeting and conferring arising after the
presentation of initial proposals shall made public within 24 hours. ' 20 8
The publication requirements of section 3595(a) appear to require
no more than ministerial acts by both parties. Section 3595(a) may be
satisfied by both exclusive representatives and employers by simply in-
forming the public that an initial proposal has been filed and will be
made available for inspection at a public meeting of the employer. In
the case of an employer, section 3595(b) assures that the public will be
heard before the employer adopts a firm initial proposal. The union's
initial proposal, however, need only be filed and made available for
public inspection at a public meeting. "New subjects of meeting and
conferring" within the meaning of section 3595(d) apparently refers
only to subjects not included in the initial proposal and not to specific
proposals. For example, in the case of change of a party's position
from wage proposal Xto wage proposal Y, wage proposal Ywould not
be a new subject and thus would not have to be made public.
The public notice provision as a whole appears to provide a useful
compromise between public and private bargaining. Its objective is
properly limited to keeping interested members of the public informed
204. Id The PERB has set up an elaborate but seldom used complaint procedure
designed to implement the public notice provisions of EERA. 8 CAL. ADMIN. CODE
§§ 37,000-37,100 (1977-1978). SEERA and HEERA rules and regulations contain no such
procedures.
205. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3595(a) (West Supp. 1979).
206. Id § 3595(b).
207. Id § 3595(c).
208. Id § 3595(d).
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on the identity of subjects being negotiated. The public has no right to
take part in the negotiations and no right to be informed when, as is
inevitable in collective bargaining, initial subjects of bargaining are
modified in the course of the bargaining process. Full-scale open bar-
gaining laws are not in the best interests of effective bargaining, nor are
they fully capable of achieving the goals of their proponents. 209 Collec-
tive bargaining agreements are in the main insufferably dull and highly
complex documents. Full-scale public participation in the bargaining
process, given the separate caucuses, the long and late-hour sessions,
the arcane language, and the bluffing and posturing that typify many
bargaining sessions, would be of little value to the public as the actual
accomplishments of the parties would be largely, if not completely, ob-
scured. In addition, no statute validly could provide the public with
access to knowledge of a union's strategy. Lack of understanding of the
strategy being employed, and how and when the strategy might shift
during bargaining, adds to the difficulty of making the process under-
standable and hence a meaningful experience for a public observer.
Moreover, the public has a limited interest in the outcome of bar-
gaining under a statute like HEERA. HEERA's scope of representa-
tion section closely limits bargaining to terms and conditions of
employment,210 and thus many subjects of public interest,21' such as
school curriculum, are not within the scope of negotiations.21 2 Even
with a direct and tangible interest in the outcome of bargaining, the
argument in favor of full-scale open collective bargaining sessions
would be weak. The problem with public participation in the bargain-
ing process stems from its potential for disrupting a highly complex and
finely tuned process;213 bargaining is difficult enough for those party
participants who understand their own tactics and strategy and who
209. For an argument in favor of citizen involvement in collective bargaining for teach-
ers, see Cheng, Hamer & Barron, A Framework/or Citizen Involvement in Teacher Negotia-
tions, in EDUCATION AND URBAN SOCIETY 219 (1979).
210. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3562(q) (West Supp. 1979).
211. See Cheng, Hamer & Barron, A Framework/or Citizen Involvement in Teacher Ne-
gotiations, in EDUCATION AND URBAN SOCIETY 220 (1979). The authors argue that bargain-
ers "do not necessarily place high priority on matters directly affecting children ...
Generally, this means that when the teacher's union is forced to choose between salary,
fringe benefits, and educational matters, the union will generally opt for bread and butter."
The argument fails to note that most "educational matters" are not within the scope of
bargaining. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543.2 (West Supp. 1979), which makes all mat-
ters of educational policy (except class size) outside the scope of representation.
212. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3562(q).
213. See Statement of Mr. Harold R. Newman, Chairman, New York PERB, in LABOR
RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 70-71 (A. Knapp ed. 1977).
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know when they are bluffing, when they are serious, when they will
shift tactics, and when to take the opposition seriously. The addition of
public participants inevitably would hamper the interpersonal reactions
necessary to foster compromise and settlement.
Bargaining Impasse and Grievance Dispute Resolution
Impasse Procedures
As defined by statute, bargaining parties are at impasse when they
"have reached a point in meeting and conferring at which their differ-
ences in positions are such that further meetings would be futile.
214
Because California law does not permit public employee strikes,215
HEERA employees, unlike their private sector counterparts, are pro-
vided with statutory impasse procedures which are designed to serve as
substitutes for strikes. These procedures are set forth in HEERA sec-
tions 3590 to 3594,216 which contain two impasse procedure steps-me-
diation and fact finding.
Mediation is the first impasse procedure step and is triggered when
either party declares that an impasse has been reached with respect to
matters within HEERA's scope of representation.217 The mediator at-
tempts to assist the parties in reaching an agreement. Mediation thus
serves as a salutary adjunct of, and complement to, the meet and confer
214. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3562(k) (West Supp. 1979).
215. See note 89 supra. However, the California Supreme Court in the recent case of
San Diego Teachers Ass'n v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 1, 593 P.2d 838, 154 Cal. Rptr. 893
(1979), ruled that public employers must, in the event of an employee strike, pursue unfair
practice remedies before the PERB rather than seek an injunction in the courts. The strike
could be read as an unfair practice because the party would be neither meeting and confer-
ring in good faith nor participating in the statutorily mandated impasse procedure. Id at 7-
8, 593 P.2d at 842-43, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 897-98. The PERB, however, would have discretion
to decide whether or not to seek a strike injunction. The PERB would be free to conclude
that an injunction or restraining order would not hasten the end of a strike and thus not seek
such action. Id at 12-13, 593 P.2d at 846, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
Since PERB may decide not to pursue an injunction, the San Diego decision represents
a significant victory for public employees and public employee organizations, who now
stand a better chance of escaping strike injunctions and the contempt citations which follow
when such injunctions are not obeyed. The major problem with the decision, however, is
that it assumes a prosecutorial role for the PERB which undoubtedly was not contemplated
by the legislature. The court mistakenly seized on EERA language concerning the PERB's
power regarding "issuance of complaints," CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3541.36) (West Supp. 1979),
language which was taken in a boilerplate fashion from an NLRA provision on the statute
of limitations, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976), and from an NLRB decision on deferral to arbitra-
tion. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971); Fresno Unified School Dist., I
P.E.R.C. 264 (1977).
216. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3590-3594 (West Supp. 1979).
217. Id § 3590.
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process. 218
Mediation contrasts markedly with fact finding, the second im-
passe procedure step. Fact finding may be instituted under HEERA at
the request of either party if the mediator has been unable to settle the
controversy within fifteen days and the mediator declares that fact find-
ing is appropriate to the resolution of the impasse.219 A fact-finding
panel then is chosen, with each bargaining party selecting one member
of the panel and the PERB choosing the panel's chairperson. 220 The
panel is charged with the responsibility of meeting with the parties and
considering and investigating their positions.221 If the dispute has not
been settled within thirty days of the panel's appointment, or within a
longer period to which both parties consent, the panel must make an
advisory finding of fact and recommendation of settlement.
222
If, however, the fact-finding procedure often reduces to nothing
more than a mediatory process serving a mediatory purpose, 223 there
may be considerable merit in eliminating the fact-finding alternative
procedure and using mediation as the exclusive impasse resolution pro-
cedure. Experience has shown the ineffectiveness of fact finding as a
viable alternative to bargaining. When fact finding is invoked in a bar-
gaining dispute, both parties tend to perceive that the fact finder will
examine the last position of each party, determine the quantitative dif-
ference between the two, roughly divide that difference by two and
award each side its portion of the divided sum. Perceiving that the fact
finder will operate in that manner, both parties will tend to ensure that
their positions at the bargaining table are adjusted accordingly. Thus,
the union's bargaining position will tend to be artificially high, and the
employer's artificially low. The elements of artificiality on either or
both sides combined may be sufficient to prevent the parties from
reaching an agreement that might have been reached, absent the avail-
ability of fact finding. Further, the advisory nature of a fact finder's
decision leaves either party free to reject the fact-finding decision.
The second ramification of fact finding militating against main-
taining the procedure as an adjunct to the bargaining process derives
from the purported authority of the fact finder. Traditionally, a fact
218. Id
219. Id § 3591.
220. Id
221. Id. § 3592.
222. Id § 3593.
223. See generally Bierman, Facfnding: Finding the Public Interest, 9 RUT.-CAM. L.J.
667, 668 (1978).
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finder has been regarded as having more "clout" than a pure mediator
because of the fact finder's ability to issue a public fact-finding report
which could publicly expose an unreasonable position taken by a party.
This presumed "clout" has not materialized, and likely will not, be-
cause to date the press largely has ignored fact-finding reports as dull
reading. Even if fact-finding reports were published, there is little
chance that the public could perceive which party's position might be
unreasonable and why. Thus, the fact finder is left with no more actual
"clout" than the pure mediator.
Grievance Arbitration
More than ninety percent of all collective bargaining agreements
negotiated in the private sector contain clauses requiring the arbitration
of disputes concerning the meaning of collective bargaining agreements
if arbitration is requested.224 Although grievance arbitration is still rel-
atively new in the public sector, its acceptance is growing.225 HEERA
authorizes grievance arbitration for nonacademic employees by not ex-
pressly excluding arbitration from the scope of representation 226 for
such employees and by expressly permitting it in HEERA section
3589.227 Section 3589 authorizes arbitration clauses and makes them as
binding and enforceable in judicial proceedings as are such arbitration
clauses in private sector contracts. Grievance arbitration clauses under
HEERA can be either advisory in nature, permitting either party to
reject the arbitrator's decision, or binding, making the arbitrator's deci-
sion final.
In public sector collective bargaining, the kind of arbitration
clause ultimately negotiated often is the product of a trade-off involv-
ing issues unrelated to impasse resolution. A union, for example, may
change a demand for binding grievance arbitration to a demand merely
for advisory grievance arbitration to induce an employer to increase its
economic package. This use of a grievance arbitration clause as a
224. See THE LABOR LAW GROUP, 1 LABOR RELATIONS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS (BNA)
160 (3d ed. 1975) (citing reports of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics). While the
total number of arbitrations held annually is not precisely known, it has been estimated that
approximately 50,000 labor arbitration proceedings are held in the United States each year.
This approximate figure is derived from annual reports of the Federal Mediation & Concili-
ation Service (FMCS), which reports on FMCS arbitration data only, reports of the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association, and a rough guess concerning the number of arbitrations held
under other auspices.
225. See J. GRODIN, JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO PUBLIC-SECTOR ARBITRATION 224 (1978).
226. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3562(q) (West Supp. 1979).
227. Id § 3589.
January 1980 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
source of negotiation strategy is unique to public sector collective bar-
gaining. In the private sector, binding grievance arbitration clauses
have long been regarded as the quidpro quo for a no-strike clause228
and both clauses are routinely negotiated.
229
Even though public employee strikes are generally illegal,230 thus
negating-at least theoretically-the need for a no-strike clause in a
public sector agreement, the use of advisory grievance arbitration is an
unfortunate development which reflects the unease and uncertainty
with which public employers tend to view the advent of collective bar-
gaining. The apparently equal ability of either party to reject the arbi-
trator's award in reality offers only the employer that option. For
example, if the arbitrator in an advisory decision decides that a griev-
ing employee was discharged, not promoted, or not paid sick leave in
violation of the agreement, the employer may reject the award and
maintain the status quo. Although the union may accept such an
award, the advisory opinion provides the union no power to do any-
thing about the employer's rejection. If, on the other hand, the arbi-
trator finds in favor of the employer, the union may "reject" the
advisory award but still is unable to do anything about the employer
maintaining the status quo. Thus, advisory grievance arbitration does
not effect a compromise between the employer and the employee. In
contrast, under HEERA, a final and binding arbitrator's award gener-
ally is enforceable in a judicial proceeding.
231
Administration by PERB
The PERB's role in grievance arbitration is a limited one. Under
HEERA, as under private sector legislation, arbitration is regarded as a
private remedy. The PERB may not become involved in the substan-
tive determination of how agreements between unions and employers
should be interpreted. 232 The sole administrative function of the PERB
228. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 n.4
(1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960); Textile Work-
ers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
229. See note 224 & accompanying text supra.
230. See note 89 supra.
231. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3589(c) (West Supp. 1979) provides: "An arbitration award
made pursuant to this section shall be final and binding upon the parties and may be en-
forced by a court .... "
232. Under HEERA, PERB has no express or implied authority to interpret or enforce
collective bargaining agreements; under EERA, PERB is expressly prohibited from enforc-
ing "agreements between the parties." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3541.5(b) (West Supp. 1979).
Cf NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967) (NLRB had power to construe
collective bargaining agreement only to extent necessary to enforce a statutory fight).
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in grievance arbitration matters is described in HEERA section
3589(d),2 33 which requires the PERB to submit a list of names of arbi-
trators to unions and employers and to designate an arbitrator to hear
and decide a case, if mutually requested to do so. Such lists are seldom
used, however; parties under PERB's jurisdiction who seek the services
of an arbitrator generally select arbitrators from among the many agen-
cies and organizations which for years have maintained lists of arbitra-
tors for that purpose.
2 34
Conclusion
Major amendments to the NLRA have been made on only two
occasions, once in 1947235 and once in 1959.236 Perhaps the remarkable
stability of this controversial and litigation-spawning statute is attribu-
table to the realization by the powerful and competing institutions reg-
ulated by the NLRA that any attempt by employers or unions to
amend the NLRA would open the amendment process to the compet-
ing side. A natural inclination of employer and union interests to move
cautiously in attempting to shift statutory power allocations in their
favor may best explain why so much of HEERA was copied from
EERA and SEERA. It may likewise explain why so much of EERA
and SEERA are identical or substantially similar to the NLRA and the
language in the thousands of administrative and judicial cases that
have interpreted that legislation.
In reading HEERA, attorneys and labor students will have no dif-
ficulty in discerning which lobbying group, either the higher education
employers or the concerned unions, influenced specific incremental
changes in the developing law as traced from its NLRA origins. Some
of those incremental changes, certain of which have been noted in this
Article, will complicate PERB's role as the primary interpreter of
HEERA. Changes like the addition of the "performing similar work"
sentence to the "supervisory employee" definition2 37 were made to
233. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3589(d) (West Supp. 1979).
234. Arbitration lists are maintained nationally by the American Arbitration Associa-
tion, a private organization, and by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. In
California, arbitration lists also are maintained by the California State Conciliation Service.
235. The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136
(1947), added the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA. For the legislative history and
purpose of these amendments, see H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1947), re-
printed in [1947] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1135.
236. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-
257, 73 Stat. 519, 541 (1959), added the Landrum-Grifin amendments to the NLRA.
237. See note 135 & accompanying text supra.
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have the law unmistakably read as it was intended that it should read.
Other changes, like the removal of issues involving promotion, tenure,
evaluation, and grievance processing from the scope of representa-
tion-matters ordinarily within the scope of negotiations238-reflect the
results of a successful employer effort to influence a sharp departure
from earlier collective bargaining models.
239
The existence of widely differing public employment collective
bargaining interests, operating at different levels of government in a
state as large and politically complex as California, may well assure
that a single, comprehensive collective bargaining statute for all Cali-
fornia public employees will not be enacted for a very long time. The
piecemeal approach of EERA, SEERA, and HEERA may prove
counterproductive, particularly for unions. Moreover, each new depar-
ture from earlier collective bargaining enactments may produce litiga-
tion which will further complicate the tasks of the PERB.
For those whose interests lie in promoting the proper administra-
tion of HEERA, potentially grave hidden problems may surface. In
the main, these problems will have their foundation not in the results
reached by the PERB in disputed cases, but rather in the amount of
time it takes the PERB to decide a disputed case. The multiplicity of
statutes administered by the PERB contributes to this delay.
2 40
The most valuable work performed by the PERB is the effort
made by its hearing officer to obtain complete or partial settlements of
disputed cases before they are litigated. The success of the administra-
tion of HEERA will depend in large part on the ability of HEERA
employers and employees to carefully consider a tentative decision to
238. See notes 167-74 & accompanying text supra.
239. HEERA's language mandating a separate unit for craft employees, on the other
hand, reflects a successful union lobbying effort. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3579(d) (West
Supp. 1979). Cf Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, 162 N.L.R.B. 387 (1966) (placing limits on
a craft union's ability to obtain a separate unit through a severance petition).
240. Exemplifying one extreme, on August 1, 1979, the PERB decided Simi Valley Uni-
fied School Dist., consolidated with Richmond Unified School Dist., 3 P.E.R.C. 10,105
(1979), an unfair practice case in which the Simi Educators Association charged the School
District with unlawfully refusing to distribute an "organizational document on binding arbi-
tration." The charge was filed on December 9, 1976, was heard by a hearing officer on
March 2, 1977, decided by him on August 26, 1977, and reached the appealed-case docket of
the PERB on September 2, 1977.
At the other extreme, most cases filed with the PERB are quickly settled before they
reach the hearing stage. Of the remaining cases heard by hearing officers, roughly half never
reach the PERB. This data is based on the author's study of PERB and hearing officer
decisions. The drop off in number of issues following an appeal is particularly acute in unit
determination cases.
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pursue a contested case to the PERB
241 and beyond.242
The resolution of questions concerning the administration of
HEERA ultimately must await the Act's implementation through fur-
ther administrative rulings and administrative and judicial decisions.
HEERA's operations then might be analyzed with an effort that results
in more than a mere outline of its main features, which is all that this
Article can provide at this juncture.
241. See generally Alleyne, 4 Symposium Introduction: The Special Value of Settlements
in Educational Employment Relations Act Proceedings, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 853 (1978).
242. PERB decisions now are reviewable in the courts of appeal. See CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 3564(c). See also Cal. Stats. ch. 7072, § 49.7 (1979). Appeals from PERB decisions for-
merly were taken to the superior courts. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3564(a) (West Supp.
1979).
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